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The Governor's constitutional power to suspend Florida public officers,
subject to review by the senate,' plays a vital role in Florida government.
Public officers are the repositories of the sovereign power of the state and the
instruments through which the power is exerted. In a real sense, the structure and operation of state and local government in Florida is largely
determined by the way in which the power of the state is distributed among
its public officers, the manner in which their power is exercised, and the
extent to which such officers are made subject to external authority. The
cohesion of the state as a political and governmental entity depends to a
significant degree on the constitutional powers invested in the Governor to
oversee the performance and functioning of public offices throughout the
state.
The greatest of these powers is the Governor's prerogative to issue an
executive order suspending public officials from office without prior hearing.
The long shadow that this executive power casts over sixty-seven courthouses tends to establish Florida as a state instead of a loose confederation
of counties. And the felt presence of the power in state offices makes the

Governor's "supreme executive power" a reality in the executive branch and
limits the extent to which an ossified, autonomous bureaucracy, impervious,
and indifferent to public needs and forces outside itself, can develop in
Tallahassee.

The executive power of suspension serves a vital public need. It provides
an effective remedy, unique among the states,2 for the chronic ill of democratic
government-the entrenchment of corruption, neglect of duty, and other
evils in public office. By virtue of the executive power of suspension, mini* A Table of Headings and Subheadings is appended to this article.
**William M. Barr, BA. 1957, University of Chicago; J.D. 1962, University of Florida;
Member of the Florida Bar.
Frederick B. Karl, LL.B. 1949, John B. Stetson University; Member of the Florida Bar;
Florida State Senator; Chairman of the Select Committee on Executive Suspensions of the
Florida Senate.
1. FLA. CONsr. art. IV, §7. Executive suspensions were formerly governed by FLA.
CONsr. art. IV, §15 (1885).
2. Parsons, The Suspension and Removal of Florida Public Officers by the Governor,
1945-1960, 15 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 400 (1962). See also the valuable analysis in Parsons, Suspension, Reinstatement and Removal of Public Officers in Florida,1945-1970, 7 Governmental
Research Bull. Sept.-Nov. 1970 (Institute for Social Research, The Florida State University).
[635]
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mum standards of public administration are established and may be enforced throughout Florida.3
Several factors make the suspension power effective. It is unquestionably
authoritative, being vested by express constitutional provision in the hands
of the chief executive officer in whom is reposed the supreme executive
power of the state. The suspension power is dearly superior to any power
or attribute of sovereignty possessed by a suspended officer. So long as the
Governor's action purports to be based upon one or more of the grounds
specified in the constitution, it is not likely to be circumvented or delayed by
jurisdictional controversy. The power is also effective because it is placed in
the hands of a single executive officer who has discretion to act without the
delays of committee decisionmaking. In addition, the power can be exercised
in a swift, summary fashion without prior notice or hearing.4 The Governor
merely issues a simple order of suspension and files it with the department
of state, whereupon the order is effective immediately. 5 Moreover, the practical potential and effectiveness of the power is much greater in the hands of
the Governor than elsewhere because of the manner in which it can be implemented and reinforced by the extensive investigative powers of the
Governor's office. 6 Indeed, when one reflects upon the suspension power, it
becomes difficult to understand how corruption and other undesirable conditions can ever firmly establish themselves in state or county offices in
7

Florida.

The senate is constitutionally charged with the duty to review the Governor's executive suspensions and, upon such review, either reinstate the
suspended official or permanently remove him from office." Although the
Governor has exclusive authority to initiate suspensions, the senate has the

3. The Governor's power of suspension "enables him to perform his constitutional duty
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed." State ex rel. Gibbs v. Rogers, 141 Fla.
237, 193 So. 435 (1940).
4. Fair v. Kirk, 317 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Fla. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 928 (1971);
State ex rel. Lamar v. Johnson, 30 Fla. 433, 11 So. 845 (1892).
5. FLA. STAT. §112AO (1969).
6. See FLA. STAT. §14.06 (1969). The Governor may require information in writing from
all executive or administrative state, county, or municipal officers upon any subject relating
to their duties. FLA. CONsT. art. IV, §1 (a). See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 213
So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1968), in which reference is made to a select commission appointed by the
Governor to investigate reports concerning the conduct of a judge of the Dade County
Criminal Court of Record.
7. The possibility that the suspension power may be abused or misused by particular
Governors should not impel the legislature or the courts to dull its sharp constitutional
edge, or to limit its broad constitutional sphere of application. As discussed below, prompt
and effective review by the senate is the intended means of correcting any misuse of the
power. The power itself should not be undermined, thereby impairing the vital public
purposes that it is intended to fulfill. Similarly, particular officers or classes of officers
should not be insulated from the operation of the executive power of suspension by restrictive interpretations of the constitutional language. No sound public purpose is served
by immunizing particular officers from suspension and removal for malfeasance, misfeasance,
neglect of duty and the other constitutional grounds.

8. FLA. CoNsr. art. IV, §7 (b).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol23/iss4/1
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responsibility to make final dispositions of them.9 The senate is entrusted
with the great duty and responsibility to ensure that the awesome executive
power of suspension is used to achieve its constitutionally intended public
purposes and to see that no officer is removed for grounds other than those
provided by law.
The purpose of this article is to survey the operation and application of
the executive suspension section of the 1968 Florida constitution. The procedure by which officers are suspended and either reinstated or removed is
considered and the grounds of suspension are reviewed. The applicability
or nonapplicability of the suspension power to particular classes of officers
is discussed. In addition, the authors attempt to cast some light upon the
role of the executive suspension power within Florida's new constitutional
government and to suggest solutions to some of the problems that arise in
connection with the interpretation and application of the power.
SUSPENSION AND REMOvAL PROcEDuRE

Roles of the Governorand Senate
The suspension power operates within a constitutional framework of
great complexity. It involves and substantially affects the intricate and delicate balance of sovereign powers distributed among the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches and between the state and local administrations of
Florida government. In contrast to the complexity of the power viewed in
its constitutional aspect, however, is the remarkable simplicity of the procedure by which suspension proceedings are conducted.
The procedural simplicity of suspension proceedings is not accidental,
but is clearly contemplated by the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions. The effectiveness of both the Governor's suspension function and
the senate's review function depends in large measure on freedom from procedural encumbrances. Prompt action is of the essence of the Governor's
suspension power and responsibility and also of the senate's review. To minimize improper disruptions of the democratic process and to ensure that the
rights of the suspended officer and the public are not destroyed by despotic
or demagogic misuse of the power of suspension, it is important that the senate provide a prompt and effective review of the Governor's action with scrupulous regard for the essential requirements of due process without becoming bogged down in unessential procedural technicalities and delays.
The Governor's act of suspension is simplicity itself. The Governor merely
files an executive order of suspension with the secretary of state, whereupon
the suspension is effective. 10 The suspension order is constitutionally required
to state the grounds of suspension; 1 furthermore, the order is statutorily required to "specify facts sufficient to advise both the officer and the senate as
9. FLA. CONsr. art. IV, §7 (a). The Governor also has an unrestricted right to reinstate
a suspended offidal at any time before removal by the senate. 14,
10. Id. FLA. STAT. §112.40 (1969).
11. FLA. GONsr. art. IV, §7 (a).
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to the charges made or the basis of the suspension."'12 The order must specify
facts rather than conclusions, and mere conclusory recital of one or more of
the constitutional grounds of suspension is insufficient.2 However, the order
is not required to be as specific as a criminal indictment or information. 4
The Governor's power of suspension is executive in nature2 5 It is in no
sense judicial or quasi-judicial, although it involves judgment and discretion
and includes "the power to hear and decide."': 6 The Governor is not required
to provide any notice or hearing before issuance of the order of suspension,"
but he undoubtedly has the authority and discretion to hold a pre-suspension
conference or hearing for investigative purposes.
Of course, the absence of any requirement for a pre-suspension hearing
is not intended to condone the careless or ill-considered issuance of a suspension order. The Governor's plenary executive power to issue such an order
without notice or hearing carries with it a heavy burden of executive responsibility to make a proper factual investigation before the power is exercised.
On the other hand, when the power should be exercised, it should be done
promptly and without undue administrative delay.
Although executive suspension proceedings are not criminal in nature, the
role of the Governor in the proceedings is essentially that of a prosecutor.lB
He therefore has the prosecutorial functions of investigation and presentation of factual support for the asserted grounds of suspension. Proceedings
in the senate or its committee are required to be prosecuted by the Governor,
his legal staff, or an attorney designated by him.19
The constitution contemplates the joint action of the Governor and senate
in suspension and removal proceedings with each agency having its proper
12.

FLA. STAT.

§112.41 (1)(1969). In addition, a 1971 amendment to senate rule 12.3

provides that the senate select committee may request the Governor to file
a statement of
further facts and circumstances supporting the suspension order and require the suspended
officer to file
a response to the Governor's statement within twenty (20) days after receipt
thereof.
13. State ex rel. Hardie v.Coleman, 115 Fla. 119, 128, 155 So. 129, 133 (1934); Annot.,
129 A.L.R. 988 (1934).
14. State ex rel. Hardie v.Coleman, 115 Fla. 119, 128, 155 So. 129, 133 (1934).
15. State ex reL Hatton v.Joughin, 103 Fla. 877, 880, 138 So. 392, 394 (1931).

16. Id.
17. By statute, copies of the suspension order are required to be delivered by the

department of state to the officer suspended, the secretary of the senate, and the attorney
general. FaA. STAT. §112.40 (1969).
18. Inthe first
suspension orders considered by the senate under the 1968 constitution,
appropriate steps were taken to ensure that the Governor did not mistakenly assume that
his constitutional duties were at an end upon his issuance of a suspension order. Inreporting
to the senate the initial organizational steps taken, the chairman of the Select Committee on
Executive Suspensions said: "As soon as this Committee was appointed by the President,
I took itupon myself, as Chairman, to personally call upon the counsel for the Governor
for the purpose of giving him as much notice as possible of the time and place of the
proposed hearings and of establishing without any doubt that the role of the Governor's
office inthese proceedings would be that of prosecutor. That is,
that the Governor's office
would accept the responsibility of preparing and presenting the evidence." FLA. S.JouR.

Special Sess. 5 (Feb.17, 1969).
19. FIA. STAT.§112.43 (1969).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol23/iss4/1
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role and function.20 While the Governor has exclusive power to initiate the
proceedings, the senate's responsibility is to review the Governor's action and
to make the final decision.
One important change in the suspension procedure provided by the
1968 constitution permits the senate to act promptly on executive suspension
orders and eliminates the possibility that senate review may be delayed or
precluded by action of the Governor. The 1885 constitution merely provided
that "the cause of suspension shall be communicated to the officer suspended
and to the Senate at its next session." 2 This procedure was unsatisfactory
even though the suspended officer automatically resumed his duties if the
senate failed to act on the suspension.22 Under the 1968 constitution, the
suspension order is filed with an independent officer, the secretary of state,23
who is charged with the duty to deliver copies to the- suspended officer, the
secretary of the senate, and the attorney general. 24 The order does not become
effective until it is filed with the secretary of state. 25 No further communication by the Governor to the senate is required to permit the senate to act
on the matter.26 Moreover, the undesirable delay in reviewing and disposing
of suspensions until the next session of the senate has been eliminated. The
senate may now act promptly on suspensions since it may be convened in
special session for this purpose by the president of the senate or by a majority
of its membership7
The 1968 constitution also significantly changed and improved the operation of the executive suspension power by directing that the senate act "in
proceedings prescribed by law." 28 Pursuant to this constitutional mandate,
the basic rules of senate procedure have been established by statute." The
statutory rules of procedure are, and should remain, uncomplicated and

20. See In re Advisory Opinion to Governor, 69 Fla. 508, 68 So. 450 (1915), which

contains one of the dearest expositions of the operation of the suspension and removal
power under the 1885 constitution.

21. FA. CONsr. art. IV, §15 (1885).
22. Id. The procedure of returning the suspended officer to his duties, despite the fact
that he may have been suspended on good and sufficient grounds in the first instance,

provided a poor solution to the problem of delayed senate review. The proper solution,
and the one that protects the interests of both the public and the officer, is to eliminate

the delay. This is done in the 1968 constitution and the implementing statutes.
25. FLA. CONsr. art. IV, §7 (a).
24. FLA. STAT. §112.40 (1969).

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. F'IA. CONsr. art. IV, §7(b). A 1971 amendment to Senate Rule 12.3 provides, with
certain exceptions, that the senate select committee, master, or examiner shall conclude its
hearings and make final recommendations to the senate within six months after the effective date of the suspension order and that the senate shall act upon such recommendations within thirty days after such recommendations are reported to the senate. Of course,
senate rules may be waived or suspended by a two-thirds vote of all senators present. Senate
Rule 11.2.
28.

Id.

29. FLA STAT. §§112.40-.48 (1969). In addition, certain procedures of the senate and
select committee are defined in senate rule 12.
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free from the technical difficulties and delays associated with the pleading
and motion practices common to court procedure.
The senate is authorized to appoint a select committee for the purpose of
hearing the evidence and to recommend the removal or reinstatement of the
suspended officer to the senate.30 In the alternative, the senate may appoint
a special examiner or special master to hear the evidence and make recommendations, 81 but in actual practice all suspension hearings to date under
the 1968 constitution have been conducted by the senate's Select Committee
on Executive Suspensions.3 2 The committee is required to afford a full and
complete public hearing although either the senate or the committee may
conduct portions of the hearing in executive session.3 3 The suspended official
must be notified of the time and place of the hearing sufficiently in advance to afford him an opportunity fully and adequately to prepare his de3 4
fenses, which may be presented by him or by his attorney.
The action of the senate, either removing or reinstating the suspended
officer, is to be set forth in a report and an order signed by the president of
the senate and filed with the department of state.35 As is true of the executive
order of suspension, the senate's action becomes effective immediately upon
the filing of the order with the department of state. 6 The department of
state is required to deliver copies of the senate order to the Governor, the
37
officer involved, and the governing body of the county, district, or state.
Upon reinstatement, the suspended official is entitled to receive such pay and
emoluments of his office as he would have received if he had never been
suspended,-3 and the senate may make provision for payment of the officer's
costs and reasonable attorney's fees.3 9

80. Id. §112.41 (3) (1969).
31. Id. §112.41 (4) (1969).
32. Prior to enactment of the statutory procedure in 1969, the Select Committee on
Executive Suspensions conducted the initial suspension hearings under the 1968 constitution
on the basis of rules of procedure and substantive interpretations developed by the committee with the assistance and advice of committee counsel. The committee's initial rules
and interpretations are set forth in detailed reports appearing in FLA. S. Jout. Special
Sess. (Feb. 17, 1969). These initial rules and the experience developed in the initial
suspension proceedings provided the basis for the statutory procedure subsequently enacted as FLA. STAT. §112.40 et seq. (1969).
33. FLA. STAT. §112.47 (1969). A 1971 amendment to senate rule 12.3 provides that
the select committee, master, or examiner may hold a pre-hearing conference with coun.
sel for the Governor and for the suspended official to narrow the issues, identify the
witnesses, and review the testimony and other evidence anticipated to be presented by
each side.
34. Id.

35. Id. §112.45 (1) (1969).
86. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. §112.45 (2) (1969).

39. Id. §112.44 (1969).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol23/iss4/1
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Misconduct Priorto Present Term of Office
Under the constitution of 1885, the Supreme Court of Florida consistently
adhered to the view that an officer could not be suspended for misconduct
occurring prior to his present term of office. 40 The executive power of suspension was deemed to be restricted in all respects to the official's current
term of office. 41 An official's reappointment or re-election to office was regarded as a condonation of known prior offenses.42 An exception to this
rule was recognized for misconduct of a continuing nature such as a persistent failure to perform law enforcement duties. Such neglect of duty in a
prior term, continuing into the officer's present term, constituted a valid
43
ground for suspension.
The foregoing judicial rules of construction 4" have been replaced by
section 112.42, Florida Statutes, which provides:
The governor may suspend any officer on any constitutional ground
for such suspension that occurred during the existing term of the officer
or during the next preceding four years ....
The rigid restriction imposed by the judicial rule left something to be
desired from a policy standpoint. An officer's re-election certainly cannot
be regarded as a condonation of prior offenses that were not publicly known
at the time of his re-election. Under the former rule, an official could circumvent suspension proceedings and their attendant public disclosure of
his misconduct simply by resigning from office and thereafter standing for
re-election before an electorate ignorant of his misdeeds.
The statute provides a needed relaxation of the previous court rule. It
also serves the useful purpose of providing a reasonable period of limitation
prior to which offenses and misconduct cannot provide grounds for suspension. However, the broad, permissive language of the statute clearly contemplates the exercise of sound discretion by the Governor in determining
whether prior misconduct warrants suspension of officials in particular cases.
The statute is not meant to add to the constitutionally defined disqualifications from holding public office. Nor does it in any way require or justify
suspension of an officer for arbitrary and unsubstantial reasons. Except in

40. E.g., Rosenfelder v. Huttoe, 156 Fla. 682, 24 So. 2d 108 (1945); State ex rel.
Hardee v. Allen, 126 Fla. 878, 172 So. 222 (1937); In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor,
64 Fla. 168, 60 So. 336 (1912). Cf. State ex reL. Hand v. McDonald, 154 Fla. 456, 18 So.
2d 16 (1944).
41. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 31 Fla. 1, 12 So. 114 (1893).
42. State ex reL. Hardee v. Allen, 126 Fla. 878, 172 So. 222 (1937).
43. Id. at 884, 172 So. at 225.
44. The Senate Select Committee on Executive Suspensions considered itself bound
by these judicial rules in its suspension hearings held in January and February 1969. FLA.
S. Jomu Special Sess. 7 (Feb. 17, 1969). Because of the rule against suspension for prior
misconduct, and for other reasons set forth in its reports, the committee recommended
"with reluctance" that certain suspended members of the Board of County Commissioners

of Taylor County be reinstated. Id. at 20, 21.
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1971
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cases of commission of a felony, the ground for suspension should have
some rational and substantial bearing on the officer's performance of his
duties and responsibilities in his present office.
Re-Suspension After Reinstatement: The Question of Res Judicata
In its special session held on February 17, 1969, the Florida Senate considered the cases of several public officers who were re-suspended by the
Governor after they had been reinstated by the senate.45 The senate was
therefore squarely confronted with the problem of determining the legal
effect of its reinstatement of an official and whether such reinstatement
precludes the Governor from re-suspending the same official on the same or
other charges at a later time.
After studying the problem, the Select Committee on Executive Suspensions recommended that the senate adhere to the following rules:4 6
(1) A public official may not be suspended or removed upon the
same grounds and for the same offenses for which the official was
previously suspended and which were previously heard and determined
by the Senate.
(2) An official should not be suspended or removed on the basis
of charges or evidence which were known or which reasonably should
have been known to the Governor and his counsel at the time when
other charges and evidence against the same official were presented to
a previous session of the Senate.
In the first
the senate's
and subject
mendation,

of these recommendations, the select committee proposed that
action in reinstating a suspended official should be deemed final
to the doctrine of res judicata. a' The committee's second recomprecluding the Governor's piecemeal assertion of grounds for

45. Id. at 6-7.
46. Id.
47. The doctrine of res judicata was applied to proceedings before a municipal personnel board to remove a city employee in Rubin v. Sanford, 168 So. 2d 774 (Sd D.C.A.
Fla. 1964). The Supreme Court of Florida has ruled that the doctrines of res judicata and
double jeopardy do not apply to proceedings of the Judicial Qualifications Commission.
In re Kelly, 288 So. 2d 565, 570 (Fla. 1970). However, important differences exist between
the executive suspension procedure and proceedings of the Judicial Qualifications Commission. The supreme court has broad discretion and flexibility in acting on the commission's recommendations. The court may order "removal, discipline or retirement, as
it finds just and proper, or wholly reject the commission's recommendation." FA. CONSr.
art. V, §17A (3). Intermediate disciplinary sanctions clearly are not final in nature. As the
court pointed out in the Kelly case, a reprimand does not amount to an acquittal. In re
Kelly, 288 So. 2d 565, 570 (Fla. 1970). In contrast, the senate is empowered only to make
final dispositions of suspension proceedings by removing or reinstating the suspended
officer. FLA. CONsT. art. IV, §7(b). In addition, the Judicial Qualifications Commission
operates entirely within the judicial branch. FLA. CONsr. art. V, §17A(2). Its proceedings,
therefore, do not raise the kind of jurisdictional questions that arise from the distinct
separation of power present in the executive suspension procedure.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol23/iss4/1
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suspension, is analogous to court rules requiring compulsory joinder of claims
or prohibiting the splitting of causes of action.
Both of the proposed rules were explicitly recited and applied in the
select committee's reports concerning the officials whose cases had raised
the issue in the first instance.45 In each of these cases, the select committee's
49
report was adopted by the senate.
Both rules are essential to the proper functioning of the executive suspension procedure.5 0 After the senate has completed a full hearing and has
48. FLA. S. JOUR. Special Sess. 8 (Feb. 17, 1969) (suspension of George A. Kelsey, Constable, District Three, Seminole County); id. at 9 (suspension of W. Hugh Duncan, Justice
of the Peace, Fourth District, Seminole County); id. at 20-28 (suspensions of W. N. Wood,
et al., Members of Board of County Commissioners, Taylor County).
49. Neither rule precludes the Governor from suspending an official on grounds that
arose after reinstatement or that could not reasonably have been discovered by the Governor in an earlier proceeding. Moreover, neither rule applies in cases in which the senate
takes no action on the initial suspension. This occurred in the case of Robert J. Haslett,
Clerk of the Criminal Court of Record of Polk County. The initial suspension order was
based on criminal indictments. The senate considered the matter but took no action pending
a jury trial on the criminal charges. Under the 1885 constitution, this resulted in the automatic reinstatement of the officer. The Governor issued a second suspension order. The
officer was later convicted of the criminal charges. During the pendency of his appeal, the
senate considered the second suspension order and removed the official from office. Id. at 11.
50. In its report to the senate, the select committee explained the reasons and policy
considerations that underlie the rules:
"The Committee has determined that under the law of Florida a public official may not
be suspended or removed upon the same grounds and for the same offenses for which the
official was previously suspended and which were previously heard and determined by the
Senate. Under the Florida Constitution of 1885 and the 1968 Revision of the Florida
Constitution, the action of the Senate in removing or reinstating a suspended official is
final and may not be reviewed by any other authority, State ex rel. Hardie v. Coleman, 115
Fla. 119, 155 So. 129, 92 ALR 988 (1934); State ex rel. Kelly v. Sullivan 52 So. 2d 422
(1951); Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 196 So. 2d 737 (1967). It is firmly established
under the Florida Constitution and the Constitution of the United States that no person
shall twice be put in jeopardy for the same offense. Even in civil actions the principle of
res adjudicata requires that once a case has been finally determined, it cannot be litigated
again. The provision of the Constitution that only the Senate can remove a public official
for misconduct in office could be nullified if the Governor could indefinitely resuspend public officials after reinstatement by the Senate. Therefore, it is the recommendation of this
Committee that the Senate should not consider as grounds for suspension or removal of
a public official any charges previously heard and determined at a prior session of the
Senate.
"Similarly, it is the recommendation of the Committee that an official should not be
suspended or removed on the basis of charges or evidence which were known or which
reasonably should have been known to counsel for the Governor at the time when other
charges and evidence against the same official were presented to a previous session of the
Senate. Before suspending any official a careful investigation should be conducted by the
Governor to discover and verify all misconduct of the official in his current term of office.
Suspension of an official should be based upon all acts of misconduct in his present term
which are known or which reasonably should be known to the Governor. If a governor
can make charges against an official in piecemeal fashion, then an official elected by the
people and reinstated by the Senate can be suspended and resuspended indefinitely. This
type of wrongful suspension denies law and justice to the suspended official and the
people who elected him and imposes unreasonable costs to the suspended official, to the

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1971

9

Florida Law
Vol.LAW
23, Iss.
4 [1971], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY
OFReview,
FLORIDA
REVIEW

[Vol. XXMI

decided that a suspended officer should be reinstated, the Governor should
not thwart the constitutional authority of the senate and defeat the established rights of the officer by summarily re-suspending him. 51 The senate's
action in removing or reinstating the officer is intended to be final and
conclusive and is not subject to judicial review. 5 Therefore, it should not be
subject to executive veto either.
Rights of Suspended Officers
Florida courts have said repeatedly that a public officer has a property
right in his office that may not be unlawfully taken away or illegally infringed upon.5 3 However, public officers do not have a property interest in
their offices in the ordinary sense of that term, nor is an office "property"
in the constitutional sense.5 4 The officeholder's interest in his office is more

Senate, and to the taxpayers who must bear the dual expense of a suspended official and his
appointed replacement." Id. at 7.
51. Summary resuspension is unwarranted inasmuch as the Governor has ample means
to make a thorough investigation prior to initial suspension. FLA. STAT. §14.06 (1969). He
may require information in writing from all executive or administrative state, county, or
municipal officers upon any subject relating to their duties. FLA. CONST. art. IV, §1 (a). See
In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 213 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1968), in which the Governor
had appointed a "Select Commission" to review allegations and reports concerning conduct
of a judge of the Dade County Criminal Court of Record. The supreme court observed
that the select commission had no official status except to assist and advise the Governor
in gleaning the facts. Id. at 720.
52. State ex rel. Hardie v. Coleman, 115 Fla. 119, 129, 155 So. 129, 134 (1934); Annot., 92
A.L.R. 988 (1934).
53. See, e.g., Piver v. Stalhman, 198 So. 2d 859, 862 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1967).
54. A municipal office is not property in the constitutional sense. City of Jacksonville
v. Smoot, 83 Fla. 575, 92 So. 617 (1922). Numerous federal cases recognize that neither
public officers nor public employees have property rights in their positions. Phaire v.
Merwin, 161 F. Supp. 710 (D.C.V.I. 1958). Appointment to and tenure in public office is
neither property nor contract. Id. at 713. Government employment is not property within
the meaning of the due process clause of the United States Constitution. Jenson v. Olson,
353 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1965). Government employment is a privilege and not a property
right. Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672, 677 (2d Cir. 1966). See also Snowden v. Hughes,
321 U.S. 1 (1944); Wetherington v. Adams, 309 F. Supp. 318 (N.D. Fla. 1970). Constitutional rights and interests of the officeholder nevertheless may be violated by an arbitrary
or procedurally deficient discharge of a public officer or employee. See Birnbaum v. Trussell,
371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966); Jones v. Board of Control, 131 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1961). See also
In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1970). Cf. State ex rel. Hatton v. Joughin, 103 Fla. 877,
881, 138 So. 892, 395 (1931), which concludes that an officer's right to his office is protected
by the fourteenth amendment. It is more correct to say that the improper or wrongful
discharge or removal of a public employee or officer may entail a violation of his constitutionally protected individual rights, even though he has no right, as such, to work for
the government. Federal holdings have been summarized in these terms: "The principle
to be extracted from these cases is that, whenever there is a substantial interest, other than
employment by the state, involved in the discharge of a public employee, he can be removed neither on arbitrary grounds nor without a procedure calculated to determine
whether legitimate grounds do exist." Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672, 678 (2d Cir.
1966). See also McCarley v. Sanders, 309 F. Supp. 8 (M.D. Ala. 1970). Of course, the
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aptly described as an enforceable substantive right, rather than as a property
interest or estate. 55 It is a right or interest that cannot be bartered
or sold, but that is held by the officer for the benefit of society.", In the
absence of constitutional limitations, the legislature may abolish an office at
its pleasure even though this is done during the term for which the officer
57
was elected or appointed.
A public officer's rights in his office are conditional. He accepts and
holds his office subject to the terms and conditions established by law.55 In
particular, public officers in Florida accept and hold their offices subject to
the constitutional power of the Governor and the senate to suspend and
remove them.59 An officer has no vested rights or interests in his office that
are impervious to the constitutional power of suspension and removal. His
removal from office in accordance with applicable constitutional and statu-

tory provisions does not improperly deprive him of his property or rights
any more than does the normal expiration of his term of office. 0 However,
the removal of an officer having a fixed term of office must be in accordance with lawfully established grounds and procedural requirements. He
may be suspended from office summarily and without prior hearing 1 but
he cannot be permanently removed from office without observance of fundamental requirements of due process, including reasonable notice and a fair
hearing. 2 Officers without fixed terms who serve at the pleasure of a designated agency may be dismissed summarily without notice or hearing. 6

Florida courts' descriptions of public officers' rights as "property" may be accepted at face

value by federal courts. See Fair v. Kirk, 317 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Fla. 1970), afj'd mem., 401
U.S. 928 (1971).
55. Flood v. State, 100 Fla. 70, 76, 129 So. 861, 864 (1980). Upon reinstatement, a suspended officer suffers no loss of salary or other compensation. FLA. STAT. §111.05 (1969).
56. DuBose v. Kelly, 132 Fla. 548, 562, 181 So. 11, 17 (1938).
57. City of Jacksonville v. Smoot, 83 Fla. 575, 92 So. 617 (1922).
58. Jones v. Board of Control, 131 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1961); State v. Stuler, 122 So. 2d 1
(Fla. 1960); DuBose v. Kelly, 132 Fla. 548, 181 So. 11 (1938).
59. State ex rel. Hatton v. Joughin, 103 Fla. 877, 138 So. 392 (1931); State ex rel.
Holland v. Ledwith, 14 Fa. 220 (1872).
60. State ex rel. Holland v. Ledwith, 14 Fla. 220 (1872). No one has a right to work
in government service on his own terms. Jenson v. Olson, 353 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1965).
61. Fair v. Kirk, 317 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Fla. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 928 (1971);
State ex rel. Lamar v. Johnson, 30 Fla. 433, 11 So. 845 (1892).
62. State ex rel. Landis v. Tedder, 106 Fla. 140, 146, 143 So. 148, 150 (1932); State
ex rel. Hatton v. Joughin, 103 Fla. 877, 881, 138 So. 392, 395 (1931).
63. Bryan v. Landis ex rel. Reeve, 106 Fla. 19, 21, 142 So. 650, 651 (1932); Burklin v.
Willis, 97 So. 2d 129, 131 (Ist D.CA. Fla. 1957). As discussed later in this article, the
termination of such an officer by the agency at whose pleasure the officer serves is not a
suspension or removal of the officer as such. See text accompanying note 177 infra. The Governor's summary termination of an officer serving at the Governor's pleasure does not
entail an exercise of the executive power of suspension. On the other hand, executive
suspension and senatorial removal of an officer serving at the pleasure of an agency other
than the Governor would necessarily have to be in accordance with the limitations and
requirements of the constitutional and statutory provisions applicable to executive suspensions.
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Under the 1885 constitution the public officer's "property right" in his
office and his right to due process of law sometimes may have been more
theoretical than real. The power of suspension and removal was exercised
without the benefit of established procedural rules. 4 It is difficult to assess
the role that senatorial courtesy may have played in senate hearings held
in executive session. In some instances the speediness of the hearing accorded
to a suspended officer appears to have been its primary constitutional virtue.
Limitation of judicial review to a consideration of the sufficiency of the
allegations of the executive suspension order left the former officeholder
with no recourse if senate proceedings were deficient from an evidentiary
standpoint or otherwise. 65
The 1968 constitution specifically provides for senate action "in proceedings prescribed by law."' , Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the
1969 legislature undertook for the first time in Florida history to define
the basic procedural steps and requirements of suspension and removal
procedure. 7 Every suspended officer is now guaranteed a "full and complete
hearing, public in nature" with notice sufficiently in advance to afford him
an opportunity fully and adequately to prepare his defenses. 68
Judicial Review
Florida courts have long recognized that the Governor's power to suspend public officers is a discretionary executive power that is in no sense
judicial or quasi-judicial.69 As long as the Governor acts within the confines
of his constitutional authority, his action is not subject to judicial review.O
However, because the suspension of an officer affects individual rights the
courts have asserted the power to determine whether the Governor is acting

64. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hand v. McDonald, 154 Fla. 456, 18 So. 2d 16 (1944), in which
the senate appears to have acted upon conclusory suspension orders in executive session,

without participation by the suspended officer and on the same day the senate received
supporting factual information from the Governor's office.
65. State ex rel. Hardie v. Coleman, 115 Fla. 119, 155 So. 129 (1934).
66. FLA.CONsr. art. IV, §7 (b).
67. FLA.STAT. §§112A0-.48 (1969).
68. Id. §112.47 (1969).
69. State ex rel. Hardie v. Coleman, 115 Fla. 119, 126, 155 So. 129, 183 (1934); State
ex rel. Hatton v. Joughin, 103 Fla. 877, 880, 138 So. 392, 394 (1931); Annot., 92 A.L.R.

988, 994 (1934).
70. State ex rel. Hardie v. Coleman, 115 Fla. 119, 127, 155 So. 129, 133 (1934); State ex rel.
Hatton v. Joughin, 103 Fla. 877, 880, 138 So. 392, 394 (1931). These pronouncements accord
with the general rule that the judiciary lacks power to direct or coerce the Governor in the
exercise of any administrative function and may advise him in regard to his executive
powers and duties only when requested by him to do so. State ex rel. Axleroad v. Cone, 137
Fla. 496, 188 So. 93 (1939). In State ex rel. Crim v. Juvenal, 118 Fla. 487, 490, 159 So. 663,
664 (1935), the court said: "It is not the province of the judiciary to act as a general conservator of the Constitution as a restraint upon the powers or abuses of other branches of
the government, even in cases where the Constitution appears to have been flagrantly
violated."
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within his constitutional jurisdiction. 1 Therefore, courts may review the
jurisdictional sufficiency of the Governor's order of suspension in appropriate
2
judicial proceedings.7
The court's review is strictly limited to a determination of whether the
suspension order alleges "jurisdictional facts" that reveal a constitutional
ground for suspension and removal of the officer.73 No particular form of
order is required, 74 but a purely conclusory suspension order is unacceptable. For example, a "mere arbitrary or blank order of suspension without
supporting allegations of fact, even though it named one or more of the
constitutional grounds of suspension," was held to be insufficient by the
Florida supreme court. 75 The order will be deemed sufficient, however, if it
names one or more of the constitutional grounds and supports it with alleged
facts sufficient to constitute the grounds or cause of suspension. 7 The factual
allegations need not be as definite and specific as the allegations of a criminal
information or indictment.77 In fact, evidentiary matter has no place in
the suspension order.78 Anything of an evidentiary character in the suspension order is gratuitous and of no concern to the court.79 The court merely
determines whether the order, on the whole, contains factual allegations
"that bear some reasonable relation to the charge made against the officer."8' 0
In other words, the court's duty is at an end when it has determined the
jurisdictional sufficiency of the order without determining the correctness
of the order on the merits. The reviewing court is not to displace the discretion of the Governor and the senate by deciding whether the particular
officer's suspension is warranted under the specific facts and circumstances of
the case. sl
71. State ex rel. Hardie v. Coleman, 115 Fla. 119, 127, 155 So. 129, 133 (1934); State
ex reL Hatton v. Joughin, 103 Fla. 877, 880, 138 So. 392, 394 (1931).
72. In most instances, quo warranto is brought by the suspended officer against the
appointee named to replace him. In State ex rel. Kelly v. Sullivan, 52 So. 2d 422 (Fla.
1951), the Governor's appointee brought quo warranto against the suspended officer after
the latter's reinstatement by the Governor. In State ex rel. Lamar v. Johnson, 30 Fla. 433,
11 So. 845 (1892), the appointee brought mandamus against the suspended officer to compel him to turn over the books and equipment of the office. See State ex re. Hatton v.
Joughin, 103 Fla. 877, 138 So. 392 (1931), for a discussion of quo warranto and mandamus.
73. State ex rel. Hardie v. Coleman, 115 Fla. 119, 127, 155 So. 129, 133 (1934).
74. Id. at 128, 155 So. at 133.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. State ex rel. Hardee v. Allen, 126 Fla. 878, 883, 172 So. 222, 224 (1937).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 882, 172 So. at 224; State ex re/. Hardie v. Coleman, 115 Fla. 119, 127, 155 So.
129, 133 (1934). The legislature has now provided by statute that the suspension order
"shall specify facts sufficient to advise both the officer and the senate as to the charges made
or the basis of the suspension." FLA. STAT. §112.41 (1) (1969).
81. In Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 196 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1967), the Supreme
Court of Florida held that it may not give the Governor an advisory opinion whether
a proposed suspension order contains sufficient allegations of jurisdictional facts. The court
held that the initial determination of the existence of facts sufficient to activate the executive is solely an executive function that must be initially exercised by the chief executive
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Courts may not review the evidence or make findings as to its weight or
sufficiency because those are matters exclusively within the province of the
83
senate.8 2 All things pertaining to the evidence are questions for the senate;
the senate's judgment is final and not to be reviewed by the courts.84
Cases defining the narrow scope of judicial review of executive suspension orders do not provide a complete picture of the courts' role in suspension proceedings. Both in advisory opinions to the Governor and in adversary
proceedings, the Supreme Court of Florida has ranged far beyond questions
about the pleading requirements applicable to suspension orders and has
created a large body of judicial precedent touching upon many other aspects
of executive suspensions.8 5 This large accumulation of case law has been accepted as authoritative by all parties and agencies involved in suspension
proceedings. Moreover, there can be little serious doubt today that if an
officer is removed from office without observance of minimum requirements
of due process, or if any of his other constitutional rights are violated, he
will be afforded relief in either federal88 or Florida7 courts.
without judicial participation, either solicited or unsolicited. But cf. In re Advisory Opinion
to the Governor, 213 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1968), in which the court advised the Governor that
he lacked executive authority to suspend a judge on the ground of incompetency for
judicial decisions unsatisfactory to the Governor.
82. State ex reL. Hardee v. Allen, 126 Fla. 878, 172 So. 222 (1937). Cf. State ex ref.
Graham v. Dean, 217 So. 2d 580 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1969), in which the district court declared
that the circuit court had held "on adequate evidence" that the suspended officer's rights
to due process had not been violated and that the circuit court's finding must stand.
83. State ex rel. Hardee v. Allen, 126 Fla. 878, 882, 172 So. 222, 224 (1937).
84. State ex rel. Hardie v. Coleman, 115 Fla. 119, 129-30, 155 So. 129, 134 (1934).
85. In particular suspension proceedings, judicial review is by no means always restricted to the allegations in the suspension order. See, e.g., State ex rel. Kelly v. Sullivan,
52 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1951), in which the court determined the validity and effect of an
executive order reinstating the suspended officer.
86. See Fair v. Kirk, 317 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Fla. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 928 (1971),
in which a three-judge district court considered, and rejected, a direct assault on the
constitutionality of the executive suspension section of the 1968 Florida constitution. Fair
conceded he had been afforded procedural due process in his hearing before the senate's
Select Committee on Executive Suspensions. The court rejected Fair's contention that he
was constitutionally entitled to notice and a hearing prior to his suspension from office.
Id. at 17. At no point does the court express any doubt concerning its jurisdiction to
adjudge whether federal constitutional rights have been violated in a Florida suspension
proceeding. See also McCarley v. Sanders, 309 F. Supp. 8 (M.D. Ala. 1970), in which a
three-judge district court invalidated the expulsion of a senator from the Senate of Alabama
because he had not been afforded procedural due process.
87. The Florida Legislature has recognized that both the Governor and the suspended
officer are entitled to due process in the senate's proceedings. FLA. STAT. §112.47 (1969).
Present Florida law is dearly contrary to the view expressed in State ex rel. Hand v. McDonald, 154 Fla. 456, 463, 18 So. 2d 16, 20 (1944), that the senate may order the removal of
a public officer without notice. It was recognized in Florida at an early date that a public
officer has a property right in his office of which he cannot be deprived without due process of law. State ex rel. Holland v. Ledwith, 14 Fla. 220 (1872). In State ex rel. Hatton v.
Joughin, 103 Fla. 877, 881, 138 So. 392, 395 (1931), the court declared that "one's right to office
and the emoluments thereof is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." See State ex rel.
Graham v. Dean, 217 So. 2d 580 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969), in which the district court tacitly
acknowledged the circuit court's jurisdiction to adjudge whether the suspended officer had
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The Florida constitution of 1885 authorized the Governor to suspend
officers for malfeasance, misfeasance, neglect of duty in office, commission of
any felony, drunkeness, or incompetency.88 The 1968 constitution adds a new
ground, "permanent inability to perform his official duties,"89 and makes
slight changes of terminology in stating three of the old grounds: "neglect of
duty in office" is shortened to "neglect of duty"; "commission of any felony"
is replaced by "commission of a felony"; and "incompetency" is changed to
"incompetence."00
Each of the grounds specified in the 1885 constitution was defined by the
Supreme Court of Florida in the leading case of State ex rel. Hardie v.
Coleman as follows:91
Malfeasance has reference to evil conduct or an illegal deed,
the doing of that which one ought not to do, the performance of an
act by an officer in his official capacity that is wholly illegal and wrongful, which he has no right to perform or which he has contracted not
to do....
Misfeasance is sometimes loosely applied in the sense of malfeasance.
Appropriately used, misfeasance has reference to the performance by
an officer in his official capacity of a legal act in an improper or illegal
manner, while malfeasance is the doing of an official act in an unlawful manner. Misfeasance is literally a misdeed or a trespass, while nonfeasance has reference to the neglect or refusal without sufficient excuse to do that which was an officer's legal duty to do.
Neglect of duty has reference to the neglect or failure on the part
of a public officer to do and perform some duty or duties laid on him
as such by virtue of his office or which is required of him by law. It
is not material whether the neglect be willful, through malice, ignorance,
or oversight. When such neglect is grave and the frequency of it is
such as to endanger or threaten the public welfare it is gross....
The commission of a felony as ground for removal from office has
reference to a felony as distinguished from a misdemeanor under our
statute, and, as such, comprehends any crime punishable by death or
imprisonment in the state prison. Section 5006, Revised General Statute

been afforded due process. However, see text accompanying notes 53-63 supra.
Generalizations concerning property rights in public offices are not applicable to officers
without defined terms of office who are appointed at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Such officers may be summarily removed. See Dade County v. Kelly, 153 So. 2d
822 (Fla. 1963); Burklin v. Willis, 97 So. 2d 129 (1st D.CA. Fla. 1957).
88. FLA. CONsr. art. IV, §15 (1885).
89. F A. CONSr. art. IV, §7 (a).
90. Id. In addition, the 1968 constitution authorizes the Governor to suspend any
elected municipal officer indicted for crime until the officer is acquitted, unless these powers
are vested elsewhere by law or the municipal charter. FLA. CONsr. art. IV, §7 (c). Under the
1885 constitution the Governor lacked authority to suspend municipal officers. In re

Opinion of the Justices, 121 Fla. 157, 163 So. 410 (1935).
91. 115 Fla. 119, 125-27, 155 So. 129, 132-33 (1934); Annot., 92 A.L.R. 989, 992-93
(1934). The judicial definitions have been applied by the senate. See FLA. S. JouR. Special
Sess. 398 (May 13, 1970).
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of 1920, section 7105, Compiled General Laws of 1927. Suspension and
removal for the commission of a felony is not predicated on the current
use of that term.
Drunkenness, as ground for suspension and removal, has reference
to such use of spiritous, vinous, or malt liquors as impairs or incapacitates an officer in the efficient discharge of his official duties. The
impairment or incapacity may be slight, temporary or permanent.
It has been said to be a self-imposed disability, and in consequence
is not to be regarded with that kindness and indulgence which we
concede to blindness, deafness, or any other physical infirmity.
Incompetency as a ground for suspension and removal has reference
to any physical, moral, or intellectual quality, the lack of which incapacitates one to perform the duties of his office. Incompetency may
arise from gross ignorance of official duties or gross carelessness in the
discharge of them. It may also arise from lack of judgment and discretion or from a serious physical or mental defect not present at the
time of election, though we do not imply that all physical and mental
defects so arising would give ground for suspension.
Incompetence
In a 1968 advisory opinion,92 the supreme court re-examined its sweeping
definition of incompetency as expressed in the Hardie case. The court pointed
out that Hardie involved the suspension of a member of the executive branch
-a sheriff -and indicated that the Governor would be limited to a much
narrower definition of incompetency as a ground for suspending a judge.' s
The court appeared to favor a concept of incompetency restricted solely
to deficiencies and defects arising after the election of the suspended officer.94
The court stressed the problems of separation of powers inherent in the
Governor's suspension of a judge and made it clear that the ground of incompetency does not authorize the Governor to review judicial acts and decisions as such. 95 For good measure, the court cast serious doubt on the
present validity of the Hardie definition of incompetency as applied to officers
in the executive branch. 96
Commission of a Felony
In specifying commission of a felony as a ground for suspension, the
1968 constitution undoubtedly refers to its own definition of the term

92. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 213 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1968).
93. Id. at 718.
94. Id. at 720.
95. Id. The court declared that if a judge should be adjudged mentally or physically
incompetent by a court of competent jurisdiction, the Governor may use the judicial determination as a basis for suspension on the ground of incompetency. Id. Under the 1968
constitution anyone "adjudicated in this or any other state to be mentally incompetent"
is disqualified from voting or holding office until removal of disability. FLA. CoNsr. art. VI,

§4.
96. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 218 So. 2d 716, 718 (Fla. 1968).
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"felony,"' 97 which includes Florida criminal offenses punishable by death or
by imprisonment in the state penitentiary. 8 However, the new constitutional
definition adds criminal offenses that would be punishable by death or by
imprisonment in the state penitentiary "if committed in this state." 99
An officer's conviction of a felony creates a vacancy in the office and renders any pending suspension proceedings moot.100 On the other hand,
the acquittal of a suspended officer in a criminal case to which neither the
Governor nor the senate is privy does not bind those agencies and cannot
prevent them from exercising their constitutional authority to determine
whether a felony has been committed.' 0 ' This does not mean that the Governor must ignore the existence and outcome of the criminal proceeding. In the
event of the officer's acquittal, the Governor may reconsider his suspension
order and decide as a matter of discretion that the officer should be reinstated,
but he is not compelled to do so.102
97. FLA. CONSr. art. X, §10. The language of this section is identical to the text of
the revision commission's recommendation. FLA. S. JouR. Special Sess. 27 (June 24, 1968).
98. The 1885 constitution defined a felony as "any criminal offense punishable with
death or imprisonment in the State Penitentiary." FLA. CONST. art. XVI, §25 (1885). In
the definition in the Hardie case the court notes that suspension and removal of an
officer for commission of a felony "is not predicated on the current use of that term."
See text accompanying note 91 supra. This statement presumably refers to cases such as
Chapman v. Lake, 112 Fla. 746, 151 So. 399 (1932), in which the court considered the power
of the legislature to classify an offense as a felony simply by a statutory declaration that
violators "shall be deemed guilty of a felony.
99. FLA. CONsr. art. X, §10.
100. FLA. STAT. §114.01 (1969). Conviction of a felony is not among the conditions that
are declared in the 1968 constitution to create vacancies in offices. FLA. CoNsr. art. X, §3.
However, the constitution disqualifies a person convicted of a felony from holding office
until restoration of civil rights. FLA. CONSr. art. VI, §4. An officer becomes ineligible to hold
an office by virtue of a disqualification that exists or arises during his term of office.
See State ex re!. Landis v. Ward, 117 Fla. 585, 158 So. 273 (1934). In the case of the
executive suspension of Noah J. Carter, Constable, District 9, St. Johns County, the Select
Committee on Executive Suspensions reported to the senate that the committee had received a copy of the jury verdict finding the defendant guilty of the felony of accepting
a bribe. The committee reported that no senate action would be necessary. The committee
report was adopted by the senate. FLA. S. JouR. Special Sess. 13 (Nov. 16, 1970).
101. In its report on the suspension of Robert J. Haslett, Clerk of the Criminal
Court of Record, Polk County, Florida, the senate's Select Committee on Executive Suspensions said: "Firhe Senate may consider the merits of any suspension, and in so doing,
the Senate is not bound by any determination by the Governor, a jury, or a court of law."
FLA. S. JouR. Special Sess. 11 (Feb. 17, 1969). An acquittal in a criminal prosecution will
not bar a proceeding to revoke a physician's license by the State Board of Medical Examiners based on the same offense as the criminal prosecution. State ex rel. De Gaetani v.
Driskeli, 139 Fla. 49, 53, 190 So. 461, 463 (1939). In a suspension proceeding, more than a
conclusory demonstration is necessary to prove the "commission of a felony." A real estate
broker's license cannot be suspended on the ground that he is guilty of a crime involving
moral turpitude without proof of every element of the crime. Reid v. Florida Real Estate
Comm'n, 188 So. 2d 846, 854 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
102. For example, the sheriff of St. Johns County, Florida, was suspended three days
after a grand jury indicted him for alleged acceptance of a bribe. Upon a trial of the
charge in the circuit court, the jury acquitted the officer. Thereafter, the Governor issued
an amended suspension order, broadening the grounds for suspension to include charges
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Similarly, in particular cases the Governor may delay issuance of a suspension order if he concludes that the probable prejudice to either the prosecution or defense of the criminal case outweighs the risk to the public interest and the impairment of public confidence that may flow from a delay
in suspending the officer.103 In no event would such delay be mandatory.
Moreover, in most instances the Governor's discretion will be guided by
the constitutional objective of protecting the public interest by prompt
executive action once it has been determined that grounds for suspension
exist. Pursuant to a senate rule, the senate ordinarily defers action on the
order of suspension pending the termination of the criminal case.104
Malfeasance,Misfeasance, and Neglect of Duty
In any suspension proceeding in which these grounds are asserted, the
grounds must be defined with reference to the particular duties and responsibilities of the suspended officer. 0 5 Especially when discretionary activities
of the officer are called into question, these grounds often raise elusive factual
questions that must be resolved by the application of sound judgment to the
facts and circumstances of the particular case. 06
that the sheriff had permitted widespread gambling, bolita, and houses of prostitution to
flourish in St. Johns County. The sheriff was thereafter removed by the senate. FLA. S. JouR.
Special Sess. 4, 11 (Nov. 16, 1970).
103. The Supreme Court of Florida has prescribed a similar discretionary rule for the
Board of Governors of the Florida Bar in bringing disciplinary proceedings against attorneys at law. See FA. S. CT. BAR. R. art 11.02(3) (b), Integration Rule of the Florida Bar.
104. FLA. S.R. 12.3 (b) (1970) provides: "An executive suspension of a public official
who is under indictment or who has pending against him criminal charges fied by the
appropriate prosecuting officer in a court of record shall not be referred to a select committee nor considered by the Senate until the pending charges have been dismissed or
until final determination of the charges at the trial court level."
105. The concept of fault probably underlies each of these grounds. The supreme
court has considered the relationship between the Governor's authority to suspend an
official for neglect of duty in office and a statute authorizing the Governor to grant leaves
of absence to state officers called -into military service. In re Advisory Opinion to the
Governor, 151 Fla. 44, 9 So. 2d 172 (1942). The majority of the court concluded that mere
absence with leave in national war service, without more, did not constitute a ground of
suspension and removal. In a separate opinion concurred in by Justice Thomas, Justice
Buford disagreed. Id. at 58, 9 So. 2d at 177. Justice Buford pointed out that the public
officer who suffers personal misfortune as a consequence of military service stands in the
same position as other citizens who must abandon their businesses and professions. He
said: "The office-holder is protected by no halo under the Constitution which will immunize him from sacrifice or which may guarantee his tenure of office regardless of his
inability, because of the emergency, to give it his personal attention. Id. at 62, 9 So. 2d
at 179.
106. The suspension of Lloyd F. Early, Superintendent of Schools of Palm Beach
County, presented the problem of weighing a school superintendent's performance in a
public school system that had fallen into a state of tumult and crisis, aggravated by acute
conflict among the superintendent and members of the school board, the press, and
a dedicated citizens' group that became "a general, investigative committee roaming
through the school system striking the same kind of terror in the hearts of the staff and
instructional personnel as the citizens experienced with vigilantes of another era." The
senate adopted the select committee's report recommending reinstatement. In its report
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For instance, suspension of a county solicitor for "neglect of duty," consisting of a failure to bring criminal prosecutions, presents a troublesome
problem of reviewing the officer's quasi-judicial discretion07 Other difficult
questions arise when peace officers are charged with either unduly lax or
unduly zealous law enforcement efforts. For example, in considering the
suspension of the sheriff of St. Johns County, the senate's Select Committee
on Executive Suspensions concluded that the mere existence of flourishing
illegal activities in that county did not constitute malfeasance or misfeasance
on the part of the sheriff. As the committee said in its report: "Unless he
knew or should have known of their existence, and either failed to act or
actually permitted their continuation he could not be faulted."108 Novel
questions were also raised by the suspension of a constable and justice of
the peace charged with malfeasance, misfeasance, neglect of duty and incompetency in office by virtue of their alleged operation of a "speed trap"
in Coleman, Florida. The select committee was obliged first to define the
elements of a "speed trap" and then to measure the definition against the
facts. Concerning the element of "overemphasis," the committee concluded:09
The question of overemphasis is a difficult and subjective one.
When does a law enforcement officer overemphasize law enforcement?
Or stated another way: How many arrests does a traffic officer have
to make before he ceases doing his duty and begins operating a "speed
trap"? The Committee considered all of the evidence presented and
reached the conclusion that the number of arrests here was not unreasonable under the circumstances.
Statutory Grounds
The Florida Legislature has from time to time enacted numerous statutes
that prescribe grounds for suspension and removal of public officers.11 0 These
statutes raise numerous constitutional problems and present many questions
of statutory construction, which are considered in another section of this
article."'
OFFICERS SUBJECr TO ExECuTIvE SUsPENsIoN
The Governor's power of suspension applies only to public officers, not
to public employees.112 However, its application to public officers is the genthe committee concurred in the suspended official's own appraisal that he had done a
creditable job under the circumstances. FLA. S. JouR. Special Sess. 9-11 (Nov. 16, 1970). In
such cases the Governor and senate can do no better than strive to "illuminate their course
by the constitutional mandate and in its light protect society, and be just to the officer
suspended." State ex rel. Hardie v. Coleman, 115 Fla. 119, 130, 155 So. 129, 134 (1934);
Annot., 92 A.L.R. 989 (1934).
107. State ex rel. Hardee v. Allen, 126 Fla. 878, 172 So. 222 (1937).
108. FLA. S. JouR. Special Sess. 11 (Nov. 16, 1970).
109. Id. at 12.
110. A listing of several of these statutes is contained in an appendix to this article.
111. See text accompanying notes 172-194 infra.
112. The courts consider many factors in distinguishing offices from employments. The
most important distinguishing characteristic of an office is that a portion of the sovereign
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eral rule, subject only to exceptions that are expressly defined in the constitution.1 The suspension section explicitly excludes state officers subject to
impeachment. As discussed below, members and officers of the legislature are
exempt from the power. Municipal officers are likewise excluded from its
operation with certain exceptions. With certain limitations discussed below,
the executive suspension power reaches judges not subject to impeachment
and other judicial officers. Questions concerning the application of the suspension power to county officers and state officers in the executive branch are intimately intertwined with questions concerning the legislature's authority
to prescribe the structure and organization of county governments and the
executive branch of state government, including the power to establish
county and executive state offices and to regulate the manner in which the
incumbents of such offices are selected, suspended, and removed. Accordingly,
suspension of county and state executive officers is discussed below in connection with other aspects of the problem of legislative regulation.
Judgesand Judicial Officers
Supreme court justices, judges of district courts of appeal, and circuit
judges are all subject to impeachment; consequently, they are not subject
to the Governor's power of suspension.114 However, judges of criminal courts
of record, courts of crimes, civil courts of record and juvenile courts, as
well as county judges and justices of the peace are not liable to impeachment and thus are all subject to executive suspension, 1 5 as are quasi-judicial
power of the State has been delegated to it or that it performs distinctly governmental
functions. State ex rel. Swearingen v. Jones, 79 Fla. 56, 84 So. 84 (1920). The leading
Florida case on the subject is State ex tel. Clyatt v. Hocker, 39 Fla. 477, 22 So. 721 (1897).
Cf. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 225 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1969), a decision under
the 1968 constitution, in which the court appears to accept constitutional and statutory
designations of the secretary of administration as an "officer" as controlling. A valuable discussion of the officer-employee distinction appears in Waldby, The Public Officer-Public
Employee Distinction in Florida, 9 U. FLA. L. REV. 47 (1956).
113. FLA. CoNsr. art. IV, §7; In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 52 So. 2d 646

(Fla. 1951).
114. Impeachment of these judges is provided for in three sections of the 1968 constituition. FLA. CONsr. art. III, §17; art. V, §§17A (1), (3). The jurisdiction of the Judicial
Qualifications Commission likewise extends only to justices of the supreme court and
judges of the district courts of appeal and circuit courts. FLA. CONsr. art V, §17A. The
recommendation of the Constitutional Revision Commission would have eliminated the
Governor's power to suspend judges. Article 3, section 18 of the commission recommendation made "Justices of the supreme court and judges of other courts" liable to impeachment, while retaining the exclusionary term "any state officer not subject to

impeachment" in article 5, section 5, dealing with executive suspensions. The revision
commission likewise expanded the jurisdiction of the Judicial Qualifications Commission
to include "any justice or judge, except judges of municipal courts and of courts of
chartered counties." Revision Commission Recommendation, art. 5, §14(d).
115. In re Advisory Opinion to Governor, 75 Fla. 674, 78 So. 673 (1918).

116. See, e.g., the record of senate proceedings wherein the State Attorney of the Third
Judicial Circuit was reinstated. FLA. S. JouR. Special Sess. 11-14 (Feb. 17, 1969).
117. State ex tel. Gibbs v. Rogers, 141 Fla. 237, 193 So. 435 (1940).
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soliditors. a B
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assistant state attorneys, 1

and county

The Supreme Court of Florida has declared that the Governor's suspension power does not include any authority to review the accuracy or prom 1 9
The court made it clear that the Governor's
priety of judicial decisions.
power of suspension operates within narrower limits when applied to judges
than when applied to officers of the executive branch. The court explained
that executive review of judicial decisions would be inconsistent with
the doctrine of separation of powers, which contemplates an independent
judiciary.120 In addition, the court declared that the appellate jurisdiction
constitutionally conferred upon Florida courts is exclusive and therefore precludes any appellate review of court decisions by the Governor. 121 Somewhat
cryptically, the court added that if a court of competent jurisdiction declared
a judge to be physically or mentally incompetent "the Governor may use
such judicial determination as a basis for suspension on the ground of
1
incompetency." 22
Legislatorsand Legislative Officer*
The Florida Legislature traditionally has enjoyed a high degree of autonomy as to its own personnel matters. Each house of the legislature is constitutionally designated as the "sole judge" of the qualifications, elections,
and returns of its members.1 28 Each house is authorized to compel the pres118. State ex rel. Hardee v. Allen, 126 Fla. 878, 172 So. 222 (1937).
119. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 213 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1968).
120. Id. at 718-19.
121. Id. at 720. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 213 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1968). Cf.
State ex rel. Hardee v. Allen, 126 Fla. 878, 172 So. 222 (1937), in which a sharply divided
court grappled with the problem of a county solicitor suspended on account of "neglect

of duty," consisting of a failure to prosecute certain alleged criminal activities. In important respects the 1937 dissenting opinions of Justices Ellis and Davis closely resemble

the unanimous opinion of the court expressed in its 1968 advisory opinion. Both dissenting justices emphasized that the county solicitor is a quasi-judicial officer who is
required to exercise a judicial judgment and discretion in deciding whether prosecutions
should be brought and maintained. Id. at 896, 172 So. at 229. Justice Davis pointed out
that in acting as a "one-man grand jury," a county solicitor is expected to act as an impartial investigating officer rather than an official accusor. He said: "The courts have no
power to review the judgments and findings of a Grand Jury, or substitute accusatory
officer, and certainly the Governor has no right to exercise judicial powers in that regard."
Id. at 897, 172 So. at 230. Moreover, Justice Davis recognized that because of the element
of judicial discretion, executive suspension of judicial officers is quite different from suspension of executive officers. He persuasively suggested that a prosecuting attorney's
"neglect of duty" consisting of lax law enforcement is both different in character, and more
difficult to demonstrate, than that of sheriffs, policemen, and other executive law enforcement officers. He said: "A county solicitor is in no sense a county detective nor vested with
the right to usurp the powers of the local sheriff and policemen as enforcement officers by
ferreting out supposed crimes and prosecuting them on his own knowledge." Id. at 896,
172 So. at 229-30.
122. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 213 So. 2d 716, 720 (Fla. 1968).
123. FLA. CONsr. art. III, §2. The language of this section is identical to that of the
revision commission's proposed draft. The 1968 provision: "Each house shall be the sole
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ence of absent members in such manner and under such penalties as it may
prescribe. 124 Each house may punish a member for contempt or disorderly
conduct,1 25 and each house may expel a member by a two-thirds vote.128
These constitutional provisions reveal an unmistakable intent that each
house of the legislature shall have exclusive and plenary authority over the
qualifications, discipline, and expulsion of its own members. In such matters,
the legislature is traditionally immune from both judicial review and executive interference. The Supreme Court of Florida has repeatedly declared
that it lacks jurisdiction to determine the rights of one who has been elected
a member of the legislature to hold such office. 27 Likewise, the executive
power of suspension has never been conceived to be applicable to members
of the legislature. The specific grant of authority to each house to expel a
member by two-thirds vote is manifestly intended to provide the exclusive
means by which legislators can be involuntarily unseated. Although the
Governor is granted authority to suspend from office "any state officer not
subject to impeachment,"1 28 this provision was never intended to provide a
supplemental procedure for expelling legislators. Such executive interference
with the legislature would produce abundant conflict and confusion. 29 Moreover, the senate's duty to review executive suspension orders would occasion
unseemly turmoil and conflict between the senate and the house of representatives:1 0
judge" negates outside interference much more pointedly than the earlier constitutional
" FLA. CONST. art. MI1,§5 (1885). However, the
expression, "Each house shall judge ....
expression "sole judge" is not new to Florida law. The Supreme Court of Florida declared
in 1868: "As to the eligibility of persons to be members of the Legislature, the Legislature
itself is the sole judge." Opinion to the Governor, 12 Fla. 652 (1868).
124. FLA. CONST. art. I1, §4 (a).

125. Id. §4(d).
126. Id. Noteworthy similarities of language and procedure appear in FLA. STAT. §165.18
(1969) ("The city or town council may judge of the election returns and qualifications of
its own members ... and compel attendance of its members; and two-thirds of the council
may expel a member of the same or other officer of the city or town for disorderly behavior
or malconduct in office.") The constitution specifies no grounds for expulsion of members
of the legislature. The constitution specifies a two-thirds vote only for expulsion of
members of the legislature. The municipal corporations law more broadly specifies a twothirds vote of the city council for expulsion of either a council member or "other officer
of the city or town."
127. English v. Bryant, 152 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1963); State ex rel. Rigby v. Junkin, 146
Fla. 347, 1 So. 2d 177 (1941); Opinion to the Governor, 12 Fla. 652 (1868). In 1966 state
legislatures abruptly became subject to judicial review by federal courts if a disqualified or
expelled legislator claimed a violation of his rights under the United States Constitution.
Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966). It has been said that until the Bond decision was announced, no state or federal court had assumed power to determine the qualifications of
an elected member of a legislative body since the ratification of the Federal Constitution.
Annot., 17 L. Ed. 2d 911, 912 (1967).
128. FLA. CONsT. art. IV, §7. Members of the legislature are not subject to impeachment.
FLA. CONSr. art. HI, §17 (a).
129. For example, one can readily conceive of the anomalous conflict that would
result from the Governor's reinstatement of a suspended legislator pursuant to FLA. CONsr.
art. IV, §7 (a).
130. The Supreme Court of Florida has observed that FLA. CONSr. art. I1, §§2, 5,
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The legislature enjoys exclusive control over its officers and employees as
well as its members.' 31 The legislature has taken pains to specify that the
"offices, committees and divisions" of the legislature are not subject to the
financial and other controls applicable to "agencies of government" generally and that the selection and control of legislative employees "shall be the
sole prerogative of the legislature."' 132 Article III of the 1968 constitution, as
well as applicable statutes, 133 leave little doubt that officers of the legislature
are excluded from the class of state officers who are subject to executive
suspension.
The mere performance of legislative or quasi-legislative functions does
not exempt public officers from executive suspension. Members and officers
of the legislature are exempt from executive suspension because of the institutional autonomy of the legislature itself, not simply because their duties
are legislative in nature. The doctrine of separation of powers does not preclude the suspension of officers such as county commissioners, who have
quasi-legislative duties' 3 ' but are not part of the institutional structure and
administrative machinery of the legislature itself.
grant numerous powers to "each House, acting independently of the other ... ." Hagaman
v. Andrews, 232 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1970). This is equally true of FLA. CONSr. art. 11, §4.
Executive suspension of legislators would permit the anomaly of a house member expelled
by the house and reinstated by the senate.
131. Officers of the legislature are identified in FLA. CONsr. art. III, §2 and in FLA. STAT.
§11.15 (1969). The president and secretary of the senate and the speaker and clerk of the
house of representatives serve at the pleasure of the senate and house respectively. FiA.
CONsr. art. III, §2. The auditor general serves at the pleasure of the legislature. Id. His appointment may be terminated at any time by a majority vote of both houses. FLA. STAT.
§11.43 (1969). The department of administration has no power to exercise any manner
of control over the legislative auditing committee or the staff of the auditor general. Id.
§11.44(2). Personnel matters of the legislature are generally regulated by FI"A STAT. ch. 11
(1969) and by the rules of the senate and house of representatives.
132. FLA. STAT. §11.25 (1969). Similar prohibitions against interference with the legislative auditing committee and the staff of the auditor general are contained in FrA. STAT.
§11.44(2) (1969).
133. See, e.g., the code of ethics for public officers and employees contained in F"A.
STAT. ch. 112, §§112.311-.19, (1969). Violations of the prescribed standards of conduct constitute grounds for removal from office. Id. §112.317 (1969). Complaints concerning violations by "any person liable to removal from office or suspension by the governor shall be
reported to the governor and his administrative officers in the executive department." Id.
§112.318(3) (1969). However, complaints concerning violations by legislators and legislative
employees are to be filed with the president of the senate or the speaker of the house of
representatives, who shall refer the complaint to an appropriate committee. Id. §112.318 (1)
(1969). The senate and house rules also contain standards of conduct and ethics for
senators and representatives, violations of which constitute grounds for expulsion or other
disciplinary action. FLA. H.R. 5.14; FLA. S.R. 1.39.
134. County commissioners perform both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions.
Johnson v. Wakulla County, 28 Fla. 720, 9 So. 690 (1891). The Dade County home rule
amendment expressly provided for the application of the executive suspension power to
all officers provided for in the Dade County home rule charter. FLA. CONST. art. VIII,
§I1 (1) (i). This appears to include members of the Dade County Board of County Commissioners, which was authorized to exercise the powers formerly vested in the legislature
with respect to the affairs, property, and government of Dade County. State v. Dade
County, 142 So. 2d 79,85 (Fla. 1962).
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Municipal Officers
Under the 1885 constitution the executive power of suspension did not
apply to municipal officers. Although the suspension section referred broadly

to "[a]ll officers . . .not subject to impeachment,"135 municipal officers were

excluded by judicial construction.13 6 Removal of municipal officers was
deemed to be a matter within the purview of the legislature's plenary power
over municipalities and thus subject to regulation exclusively by the legislature.137 Since 1869 municipal officers, including councilmen, have been
subject under general law to expulsion from office for "disorderly behavior
or malconduct in office" by a two-thirds vote of the city council.3s However,
removal of municipal officers is often governed by provisions of particular
municipal charters. To the extent that charter provisions are in conflict with
9
the general law, the charter provisions are controlling.1
Under the 1968 constitution, the Governor is expressly empowered to
suspend any elected municipal officer indicted for crime until the officer is
acquitted1 40 In addition, the Governor is authorized by statute to suspend

any elected or appointed municipal official when any grand jury presents or
returns a true bill against him as a result of actions pertaining to his official

conduct or duties.'- 1 The Governor is further empowered to remove the
135. FLA.CONST. art. IV, §15 (1885).
136. In re Opinion of the Justices, 121 Fla. 157, 163 So. 410 (1935). The court dedared that article 4, section 15, applied only to state or county officers or statutory district officers not liable to impeachment.
137. Id. at 161, 163 So. at 411. See Justice Thornal's enlightening discussion of the
legislature's absolute control over municipalities in Cobo v. O'Bryant, 116 So. 2d 233 (Fla.
1959).
138. FA. STAT. §165.18 (1969). A number of other general laws also contain provisions
concerning suspension or removal of municipal officers. See the compilation of statutes in
the appendix to this article. In addition, removal provisions may be found in special acts.
See State ex rel. Wilcox v. Armstrong, 127 Fla. 170, 172 So. 861 (1937). A bill introduced in
the 1971 session of the legislature, proposed to be enacted as section 112.49, Florida Statutes,
will clarify the status of officers in merged or consolidated city-county governments. The
bill provides that any official of such a merged government who shall exercise the powers
and duties of a county officer, shall be deemed to be a county officer and therefore subject
to the Governor's constitutional power of suspension.
139. Burldin v. Willis, 97 So. 2d 129 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1957). See Bauer v. City of Gulfport, 195 So. 2d 571 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
140. The Governor's constitutional power is conditioned on the absence of regulation
by statute or charter provision. FiA. CONsr. art. IV, §7 (c). However, the 1971 legislature
will consider a proposed amendment to chapter 112, Florida Statutes, which will make it
clear that the Governor's power of suspension is not affected by statutory or charter provisions for the suspension or removal of state, county, or municipal officers. The bill,
proposed to be enacted as section 112.50, Florida Statutes, will provide that the Governor's
suspension power exists concurrently with any statutory or charter authority. The bill
further provides that the Governor's power of suspension shall exist concurrently with
any statutory power to suspend or remove such officers. The 1968 constitution explicitly extends the application of other gubernatorial powers to municipal officers. In particular,
the Governor is now authorized to require information in writing from municipal officers.
Id. §1 (a). He may institute judicial proceedings against them. Id. §1 (b).
141. FLA. STAT. §166.16(1) (1969). The legislature is not constitutionally precluded
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official if he is adjudged guilty of any of the charges contained in the indictment.142
The senate does not act upon suspensions and removals of municipal
officials.143 Although judicial review of statutory removal of municipal officers
is analogous to review of the Governor's suspension orders issued pursuant
to his constitutional powers,144 the cases reveal certain differences. In the case
of municipal officers, review is usually by mandamus. 145 In addition, review
extends beyond a bare consideration of the alleged "jurisdictional facts" to
a consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence. 146
LEGISLATIVE REGULATION OF SUSPENSION AND REMOVAL

The ConstitutionalBackground
To what extent does the executive suspension section of the 1968 constitution limit the authority of the legislature to regulate the suspension and
removal of public officers by statute? This question presents itself in connection with the statutory reorganization of the executive branch.14 as well
as the legislative establishment of chartered county governments 48 pursuant to the 1968 constitution. The question is also raised by numerous
statutes enacted prior to the adoption of the 1968 constitution, which provide
for the suspension or removal of public officers.1 49 The question must be considered in the context of the important changes in Florida state and local
government accomplished or provided for by the 1968 constitution. In

from assigning supervisory duties with respect to municipalities to executive state officers.
Coen v. Lee, 116 Fla. 215, 156 So. 747 (1934).
142. FLA. STAT. §166.16(4) (1969).
143. In its initial consideration of executive suspensions under the 1968 constitution,
the senate unanimously adopted the report of the Select Committee on Executive Suspensions concluding that the senate is neither required nor authorized to act upon the suspension of municipal officials under article IV, section 7 (c), of the Florida constitution,
or section 166.16, Florida Statutes. The committee reported that this conclusion had been
reached by committee counsel, by the attorney general in a letter opinion dated Feb. 7,
1969, and by the senate president. FLA. S. JouR. Special Sess. 6 (Feb. 17, 1969).
144. Bryan v. Landis ex rel. Reeve, 106 Fla. 19, 142 So. 650 (1932).
145. E.g., State ex rel. Hawkins v. McCall, 158 Fla. 655, 29 So. 2d 739 (1947); Nelson v.
Lindsey, 151 Fla. 586, 10 So. 2d 131 (1942); Etzler v. Brown, 58 Fla. 221, 50 So. 416 (1909).
146. E.g., State ex rel. Hawkins v. McCall, 158 Fla. 655, 29 So. 2d 739 (1947); Nelson
v. Lindsey, 151 Fla. 586, 10 So. 2d 131 (1942); Etzler v. Brown, 58 Fla. 221, 50 So. 416 (1909).
147. See FLA. STAT. ch. 20 (1969), implementing FIA. CoNsr. art. IV, §6.
148. Chartered county governments may be established pursuant to either general
or special law. However, a local referendum is required for the adoption, amendment, or
repeal of the charter. FLA. CONSr. art. VIII, §1 (c). By either charter or special law approved
by referendum, the legislature may abolish constitutional county offices or provide for
choosing county officers other than by election. Id. § I (d).
149. A tabular compilation of such statutes is set forth in an appendix to this article.
The compilation may not be exhaustive. Neither the index to Florida Statutes nor any
other published texts or indexes provide a complete listing of such statutes. In the final
analysis, legal research in this area reduces itself to the frustrations and eye strain of a
page-by-page search through each volume of Florida Statutes.
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particular, the constitutional powers of both the legislature and the Governor
must be examined.
Perhaps the most far-reaching innovations of the 1968 constitution are
those that increase the power and authority of the legislative branch. The
effectiveness of the legislature as a working organization is greatly increased.' 50
The scope of the legislature's lawmaking authority is broadened by the
elimination of numerous restrictions contained in the 1885 constitution.1 5'
The 1968 constitution reveals an overriding purpose and intent to unshackle
the legislature from excessively detailed constitutional restrictions and to
afford it broad, flexible lawmaking discretion. 52 This intent is particularly
evident in provisions relating to government structure and organization. The
legislature is given what has been termed a "dear mandate" to prescribe the
organization of the executive branch1 51 It is also authorized to alter the
structure of county governments. 154 At the same time, acquisition of state
auditing functions955 formerly performed in the executive branch and the
strengthening of legislative committees515 gives the legislature a new capability to review the performance of state and local offices. 57
150. Great increases in legislative capability have resulted, in particular, from provisions for annual sessions, simplified means of convening special sessions, and authorization
of interim legislative committees to compel attendance of witnesses and production of
documents. FLA. CONsr. art. III, §§3, 5. In addition, the functioning of the legislative committee system has been immensely strengthened and improved in recent years.

151. Of particular importance in connection with the suspension and removal of
public officers is the abandonment of the prohibition against providing for the selection
of statutory state and county officers by any means other than "election by the people
or appointment by the governor." FLA. CONsT. art. 1I1, §27 (1885). This provision formerly
tended to eliminate conflicts between the executive suspension power and the prerogatives
of non-gubernatorial appointive and supervisory authorities. As discussed below, the 1968
constitution permits such conflicts to arise by sanctioning the statutory creation of appointive county offices and the removal of executive departments from the Governor's
supervision.
152. As is true generally of state constitutions, the Florida constitution is a limitation
on legislative power rather than a grant thereof. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d
735 (Fla. 1961). Except as limited by the state and federal constitutions, the legislature's
lawmaking authority is plenary. See Armistead v. State ex rel. Smyth, 41 So. 2d 879 (Fla.
1949). A central objective in the efforts to revise the constitution of 1885 was to shorten,
simplify, and streamline its terms and eliminate "statutory" detail. Legislative lawmaking
discretion tended to be broadened to the extent that this objective was achieved. Proceedings of the Constitutional Revision Commission reflect a common purpose to reduce
and eliminate restrictions on legislative discretion. For example, in the debates on the
executive article, the Honorable Robert M. Ervin referred to the "policy which has been
adopted here to streamline the constitution and to let the Legislature have all of the
flexibility to meet with the problems of this state as and when they arise." [1966-1968]
Hearings on the Executive Department, art. IV, §4, Amendment 12, Before the Florida Constitutional Revision Commission at 83.
153. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 225 So. 2d 512, 515 (Fla. 1969).
154. FLA. CoNsT. art. VIII, §1.
155. FLA. CONsr. art. III, §2. See FLA. STAT. §§11.30-.47
156. FLA. CONST. art. I1, §5.

(1969).

157. In the Governmental Reorganization Act of 1969, the legislative branch is dedared to have the "broad purpose of determining policies and programs and reviewing
program performance." FLA. STAT. §20.02 (1) (1969).
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The strengthening of the legislative branch was not designed to reduce
the power and effectiveness of the executive branch in general or of the
Governor in particular. The aim was to revitalize state government by increasing the effectiveness of both the legislative and executive branches. Nor
did the constitutional recognition of the statutory "cabinet system"'158 that
had evolved under the 1885 constitution signify an intent to diminish the
Governor's executive powers. Measured against the bare language of the
1885 constitution, the provisions of the executive article of the 1968 constitution superficially appear to reduce the role and authority of the Governor
in the executive department. Measured against the actual diffusion, dilution,
and atrophy of the Governor's "supreme executive power," which resulted
from a gradual process of attrition under the 1885 constitution, the new
executive article achieves a considerable strengthening of the office of the
Governor.15 9 Although the reality of the cabinet system was given constitutional sanction, it was simultaneously simplified and, to some extent, rationalized.1 69 The effectiveness of the Governor's office was increased to the extent
permitted by political realities.161
158. For discussions of the "cabinet system" as it developed under the 1885 constitution see McCollum, The Florida Cabinet System-A Critical Analysis, 43 FLA. B.J. 156
(1969); Waldby, The Public Officer-Public Employee Distinction in Florida, 9 U. FtA. L.
REv. 47 (1956).
159. Under the 1885 constitution, Florida Governors served a four-year term and
were ineligible for reelection to the next succeeding term of office. FLA. CoNsr. art. IV, §2
(1885). Cabinet officers were not so disabled and could therefore serve several terms in
succession. See FLA. CONsr. art. IV, §20 (1885). The Governor's ineligibility to succeed
himself tended to undermine both the political muscle and the administrative effectiveness
of the office. It tilted the balance of power in favor of the cabinet and the legislature despite the constitutional grant of "Supreme Executive power" to the Governor. FIA. CONsT.
art. IV, §1 (1885). The 1968 constitution markedly increased both the political and administrative potential of the Governor's office by permitting the Governor to serve two
terms in succession. FLA. CONsr. art. IV, §5 (b).
160. The Constitutional Revision Commission rejected a proposal that the legislature be
afforded unqualified discretion simply to prescribe the administration of executive departments "by law" instead of designating the particular options for the "direct supervision"
of executive departments, which are set forth in article IV, section 6, of the 1968 constitution. Moreover, the particular options ultimately adopted in the 1968 constitution eliminate
the earlier legislative practice of establishing boards administered by various groupings
of some, but not all, cabinet members. Although the 1968 constitution permits executive
departments to be placed under the direct supervision of a single cabinet member, this
option appears to be intended to permit the legislature to provide each cabinet member
with a department performing that member's particular constitutional duties and related
functions. FLA. CoNsr. art. I1, §8. It does not appear to be intended to permit the reduction
of the Governor, as the chief executive officer of the state, to the role of an outcast in
the executive branch. It is important to note, moreover, that bills prescribing the organization of the executive branch are subject to the Governor's veto power.
161. During the debates before the Constitutional Revision Commission, the Honorable
Earl Faircloth asked the Honorable John J. Crews, Jr. if the constitution might not be
improved by eliminating the placement of executive departments under the supervision
of individual cabinet members. The following enlightening colloquy ensued:
Mr. Faircloth: "[Would it not be improved if we further struck out the next three
words, 'a cabinet member,' which would then remove the fragmentation of the executive
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The "supreme executive power" of the state remains vested in the Governor and he remains charged with the duty to "take care that the laws be
power without the governor having any supervision over a single cabinet member to whom
the Legislature might assign some responsibility or to a group of cabinet members, exclusive of the governor? Would that not be an evil that would be corrected?"
Mr. Crews: "Well, Mr. Faircloth, I learned a long time ago not to get over in an
argument that couldn't . . . possibly gain anything but lose you votes. I personally think

that the proliferation of the executive power is bad in this state. But I don't want to go
any further and cause anyone [not] to vote for this good amendment because I said something there that they didn't like."
Mr. Faircloth: "Is what you are trying to tell us, Mr. Crews, that your philosophy is
that you do not intend to uncover more snakes this afternoon?"
Mr. Crews: "I don't want to violate the rules, but, Mr. Faircloth, I think that you put
your finger on it right there." [1966-1968] Hearings on the Executive Department, art IV,
§4, Amendment 12, Before the Florida Constitutional Revision Commission at 83.
In the debates before the Commission on a substitute amendment offered by Messrs.
Lawton M. Chiles, Donald H. Reed, Jr., and John J. Crews, Jr., containing provisions
similar to those of article IV, section 6, of the 1968 constitution, Judge Crews made the
following revealing remarks:
Mr. Crews: "Mr. Chairman, Lady and Gentlemen of this convention, for a number of
years many of us have watched the steady decline of state government. Many have attributed that to malapportionment of the legislature. I think one would be oblivious
to facts if he did not agree that that was one of the reasons.

"I suggest to you that there is another reason, and that is the decline, particularly in
the State of Florida, of the powers of the governor.
"Now, this amendment is offered, this substitute amendment is offered with the firm
conviction that it will slightly, oh so slightly, improve the status of the chief executive of
this state in the administration of the executive department. Second, it will also allow the
people of Florida to know, and insomuch as we have the cabinet system, who is responsible.
"Now, how many members know, how many people of Florida know the three members
of the cabinet comprising the railroad assessment board, or the securities and exchange
commission? Most people in Florida I suspect are of the opinion when thinking on those
two important matters that the governor would have some voice in the administration of
that executive and administrative function. But he does not ....
"Now, then, without adopting this substitute, the people will yet come to Tallahassee,
or look toward Tallahassee, without ever knowing to whom to look to hold for responsibility. But if we limit it to whether it is either in the governor, a cabinet member, which
in and of itself is not too good, but realizing from a practical standpoint that we'd have
the bankers of Florida, if you tried to bother with the comptroller, and we'd have the
insurance business and all of its related facets of power and influence against us, in the
legislature and otherwise, if we tried to bother with the treasurer being the insurance
commissioner. We'd have the school teachers if we had the superintendent of public
instruction....
"Now, understanding that, we provide for it, we go that compromise, but we say then
that that is enough, let's don't take any more the power of the governor and the understanding of the people looking to their chief executive, that he be a member of these
boards and that all members of the cabinet sit on those boards, if any sit on there, other
than the one in the one department.
"It will bring sunshine, it will bring light, it will bring responsibility. And I suggest, oh, even more important, it will allow Florida to meet some of the challenging issues
that the legislature now can meet from a legislative standpoint, from an executive standpoint." Id. at 117-120.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol23/iss4/1

28

1971]

Barr and Karl:
Executive
Suspension
andOF
Removal
Public Officers Under the 196
SUSPENSION
AND
REMOVAL
PUBLICofOFFICERS

faithfully executed." 162 The retention of these salient grants of authority
refutes any theory that the 1968 constitution reduced the Governor to the
'' s
Although the "adminstatus of a coequal member of a "plural executive."16
istration" of executive departments can be removed by statute from the Governor's "direct supervision," this does not mean that such departments are
thereby placed beyond the limits of the Governor's constitutional duties
and concerns. In particular, the legislature's mandate to reorganize the
executive branch does not sanction a statutory short circuiting of the Governor's constitutional power to suspend from office "any state officer not
subject to impeachment." The clear language of the suspension section indicates that officers remain subject to executive suspension even though they
may be placed in executive departments that are not administered under the
Governor's exclusive and direct supervision.
Other provisions of the 1968 constitution confirm that the Governor's
responsibilities are not confined to state officers in those executive departments under his direct supervision. The Governor is authorized to transact
all necessary business with the officers of government 6 4 He may require information in writing from all executive or administrative state, county, or
162. FLA. CONsr. art. IV, §1(a).
163. This was clearly explained by Senator John E. Mathews in the Constitution Revision Commission debates on executive reorganization. Senator Mathews made these important observations:
"We ought to draw the lines as to what philosophy that we are embracing. Now, the
constitution of 1885 starts out about like this draft, saying that: 'The supreme executive

power shall be vested in a governor.' Now, that's stronger language than we find in the
constitution of the United States, whose executive article starts out and says: 'The executive power shall be vested in a president of the United States.' Those are the basic grants
of executive power, except for the state we say 'The supreme executive power ... ' Now
I don't know that any governor has ever gone into court to test some of these things
that we have done with reference to assigning responsibilities to various cabinet boards
and other boards, if the governor wanted to assert his constitutionally granted supreme
executive power. Now, under the constitution of the United States, Congress knows that
any board that it creates is subject to supervision by the president of the United States
under the simple grant of power, that 'The executive power shall be vested in a president
... .' We are carrying on this language even stronger in Florida, that the supreme executive power shall be in the governor of the state.
"Now, if we're going to be consistent with that, I believe, if I'm right, if it's ever.
challenged in court, if Florida's constitution is interpreted by the courts like the federal
constitution, then I don't think that the legislature in creating boards can deprive the
man in whom the supreme executive power is vested of his general right of supervision.
The fact that we have done it in the past, and by acquiescence the governor has not
exercised his authority, is no sign that the authority is not basically there by the constitution.
"This is a chance for us to be consistent in the constitution. And in drawing the
lines as to what your philosophy is, if you are going to tailor statutes into the constitution,
they should be consistent with the grant of supreme executive power. If we are not, if
we're not going to have the supreme executive power in a governor, then we are opening
up an entirely different type of constitution than that that has endured throughout all
these years." [1965-1968] Hearings on the Executive Department, art. IV, section 4, Amend-

ment 12, Before the Florida Constitutional Revision Commission at 105-07.
164. FLA. CoNsr. art. IV, §1 (a).
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municipal officers upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective
offices. 1 5 He may initiate judicial proceedings against any executive or administrative state, county, or municipal officer to enforce compliance with
any duty or restrain any unauthorized act.16 The Governor is also charged
with the duty, in presenting his annual message to the legislature, to propose
such reorganization of the executive department as will promote efficiency
1 7
and economy. 6
The Governor's powers and duties with respect to state officers, including
the power of executive suspension, are necessary and incidental to the Governor's supreme executive power and his duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed. This does not mean that the executive suspension power is
exclusive in the sense that it precludes any and all legislative action with
respect to suspension and removal of public officers. In discharging its responsibility to prescribe the organization of the executive branch and
chartered county governments, the legislature should be accorded wide
latitude in defining the terms and conditions on which public officers shall
hold their offices. The legislature should not be precluded from regulating
the suspension and removal of officers by statutory provisions that are
supplemental to and compatible with the Governor's constitutional power
of suspension.1 68 In particular cases, the Governor's power of suspension may
exist concurrently with the statutory authority of some other agency to suspend, remove, or otherwise dismiss a particular officer.18 9 However, the 1968
constitution reveals a clear intent that the Governor's power to suspend "all
state officers not subject to impeachment" cannot be diminished or abrogated
by conflicting statutory provisions.
165. Id.
166. Id. §I (b).
167. Id. §1 (e).
168. In Bryan v. Landis ex rel. Reeve, 106 Fla. 19, 142 So. 650 (1932), the Supreme
Court of Florida declared that "in the absence of constitutional limitation, the Legislature
has ample power to prescribe the conditions under which municipal or other officers may
be appointed or removed." Id. at 22, 142 So. at 652. However, the legislature's power to
provide for and regulate the removal of constitutional officers may be limited. In In re
Investigation of Circuit Judge, 93 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1957), it is broadly declared that
"where the constitution creates an office, fixes its term and provides upon what conditions
the incumbent may be removed before the expiration of his term, it is beyond the power
of the legislature or any other authority to remove or suspend such officer in any manner
than that provided by the constitution." Id. at 604. This generalized statement probably
should not be applied in the same fashion to all constitutional officers. The power of the
legislature to regulate the removal of circuit judges and other officers subject to impeachment is undoubtedly slight, if it exists at all. The viability of FLA. STAT. §§114.02, .03
(1969), for example, which provide for the summary ouster of cabinet members, is subject
to considerable doubt under the 1968 constitution. On the other hand, the legislature has
extensive authority with respect to local taxing officials and other constitutional county
officers and such authority may well encompass provisions touching upon their suspension
and removal. See FiA. CONsr. art. VIII, §6(e).
169. The Supreme Court of Florida concluded that the Governor had concurrent
power to suspend the Dade County Director of Public Safety despite the fact that that
officer was hired by the county manager and served at the will of the county manager,
who had power to fire him without cause or notice. McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So. 2d 428
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The 1968 constitution presents new possibilities of dashes between the
Governor and other agencies having authority to appoint, supervise, or remove officers subject to executive suspension. Although the legislature presumably will avoid or minimize such conflicts wherever possible, 170 they
nevertheless may be expected to occur from time to time, particularly within
the crosscurrents of authority present in the executive department.17 ' How(Fla. 1966). See also Dade County v. Kelly, 153 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1963). The Dade County
home rule amendment to the 1885 constitution explicitly provided that the power of the
Governor and senate relating to suspension and removal of officers "shall not be impaired,
but shall extend to all officers provided for in said home rule charter." FLA. CONsr. art. VIII,
§11 (i) (1885). The inclusion of this explicit confirmation of the continued effectiveness of
the suspension section was a sensible precaution in drafting an amendment that surgically carved a unique, customized experiment in local self-government out of the complex
provisions of the 1885 constitution. The Dade County home rule amendment contained many
such precautionary recitals. The absence of such explicit recitals in the local government
article of the 1968 constitution does not signify an intent to make the executive suspension
power inapplicable to chartered county governments. In the shortened and "streamlined"
1968 constitution, such recitals would be unnecessary. See In re Advisory Opinion to the
Governor, 52 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 1951), in which the supreme court declared that the executive
power of suspension is the general rule, which is limited only by exceptions that expressly
appear in the constitution.
Recognition that the Governor's power of suspension may exist concurrently with
another agency's power to suspend, remove, or otherwise terminate particular officers will
be of the utmost importance in resolving the questions of constitutional and statutory
interpretation that will arise under the 1968 constitution. Rejection of the conqept of
concurrent jurisdiction to suspend and remove officers will necessarily lead to either
an undermining of the executive power of suspension or an unsound restriction of the
legislature's flexibility in fashioning state and county governmental organizations to serve
public needs, or both. Recognition of the concept, on the other hand, will facilitate the
simultaneous strengthening of both legislative and executive power intended by the 1968
constitution.
Bills introduced in the 1971 session of the legislature, proposed to be enacted as Sections
112.49 and 112.50, Florida Statutes, will make it clear that the Governor's constitutional
power of suspension is not affected by statutory and charter suspension and removal provisions, but exists concurrently with them.
170. One means by which such conflict can be avoided is that of establishing particular positions as employments rather than as offices, since public employees are not
subject to the executive suspension power. The legislature has discretion to determine
whether statutory positions shall be created as offices or as employments. State ex rel.
Holloway v. Sheats, 78 Fla. 583, 83 So. 508 (1919). However, the powers and other attributes
of the position, rather than the label affixed to it, determine whether it is an office or an
employment. McSween v. State Live Stock Sanitary Bd., 97 Fla. 750, 122 So. 239 (1929).
Cf. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 225 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1969). See Waldby, supra
note 158.
171. Such conflicts also occurred from time to time under the 1885 constitution. See
State ex rel. Woodworth v. Amos, 98 Fla. 212, 123 So. 749 (1929), in which a disagreement
arose between the Governor and the commissioner of agriculture, both of whom appeared
to have statutory authority to dismiss agricultural inspectors summarily. The conflict did
not involve the constitutional power of suspension and removal, since the term of the inspector was dearly subject to a plenary power of termination without cause. The question
was simply whether the statute contemplated that the Governor or the commissioner, or
both, possessed such power. The court held that the commissioner should act in an advisory capacity to the Governor who has ultimate and plenary power to remove.
An imbroglio concerning the removal of the tute hsealth officer is described in In re
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ever, such conflicts are of relatively minor importance in comparison to the
vital purposes served by the executive power of suspension. That power
cannot be restricted to those cases in which it may be exercised without
conflict with other political or administrative authority. The essential mission of the power is to provide a swift and sure means of dislodging corruption and malfeasance from public offices where other political and administrative processes have failed.
Statutory Regulation - ParticularProblems
Each statute touching upon the suspension or removal of public officers
has its own legislative history and context and raises its own peculiar questions and problems. Although each of these statutes cannot be discussed here
in detail, certain statutory problem areas are treated in a general way in the
following paragraphs.
Officers Serving at Pleasure of Governor. Officers without fixed terms of
office, who are appointed to serve at the pleasure of the Governor, may be
summarily terminated by the Governor without cause.27 2 Since the term of
such officers is conditioned on the will or pleasure of the Governor, the
Governor may declare the term to be at an end at any time. The constitutional suspension section contemplates a "premature" suspension and removal
of an officer before his term would otherwise expire. The section is inapplicable to officers whose terms may be summarily ended by the Governor.1 7
Such an officer does not have the kind of "property right" in his office that
is associated with officers appointed or elected for fixed terms. Having accepted his office conditioned on the Governor's pleasure, the officer cannot
claim tenure and rights under the constitutional suspension section. By
establishing statutory offices whose incumbents serve at the pleasure of the
Governor, and not for a fixed term, the legislature does not impair or diminish the executive power that the suspension section vests in the Governor.
Instead, the Governor's authority with respect to the officer in question is
increased, and freed from the restrictions imposed by the suspension section,
including senate review.
Officers Subject to Independent Appointive and Removal Authority. Under
the 1885 constitution, state and county officers were required to be either
Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 78 Fla. 9, 82 So. 608 (1919). The cryptic advisory
opinion in this case casts little light on the Governor's executive powers and duties in the
situation.
172. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 76 Fla. 500, 80 So. 17 (1918). See State
ex rel Woodworth v. Amos, 98 Fla. 212, 123 So. 749 (1929). Most of the Florida cases concerning the dismissal of officers serving at the pleasure of the appointing authority are
cases dealing with municipal officers. The leading case is Burklin v. Willis, 97 So. 2d 129
(Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1957). See also State ex rel. Gibbs v. Bloodworth, 134 Fla. 369, 184 So.

1 (1938); Bryan v. Landis ex rel. Reeve, 106 Fla. 19, 142 So. 650 (1932).
173. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 76 Fla. 500, 80 So. 17 (1918).
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elected by the people or appointed by the Governor. 17 4 Because the Governor
had the sole and exclusive power to appoint such officers, conflicts between
the executive power of suspension and independent appointing authorities
tended to be precluded.'75 The 1968 constitution omits the Governor's exclusive power of appointment and thereby makes such conflicts possible.
The 1968 constitution affords the legislature broad flexibility in establishing statutory county offices. The traditional elective constitutional county
offices may be abolished and replaced by statutory offices that may be appointive rather than elective.176 Nor does the legislature appear to be precluded from establishing statutory county offices without fixed terms, whose
incumbents serve at the pleasure of a local appointing authorityY 77 Furthermore, when the legislature establishes chartered county governments or
otherwise creates statutory county offices whose incumbents are appointed for
fixed terms, there seems to be little doubt that the legislature may provide
for the suspension or removal of such officers by local appointing agencies.
However, nothing in the local government article of the 1968 constitution
purports to restrict or limit the Governor's constitutional power to suspend
such locally appointed statutory county officers. The suspension section's
applicability to "any county officer" would therefore appear to give the
Governor and senate concurrent authority with local agencies to suspend
and remove such officers.17 8 In case of conflict between the Governor's power
of suspension and local agencies having statutory powers of appointment or
removal, the supreme executive power of the Governor must necessarily
prevail.
The executive reorganization section of the 1968 constitution, raises questions of somewhat greater difficulty. In particular, problems of interpretation
7
are presented by the ambiguous language of subsection (a), which provides:1 9
[When provided by law, confirmatior by the senate or the approval of three members of the cabinet shall be required for appointment to or removal from any designated statutory office.
This language has apparent reference to the legislature's preceding option
174. FLA. CoNsT. art. IM, §27 (1885). The Governor's exclusive power of appointment
under this section was not deemed to apply to district officers, as opposed to state and
county officers. Town of Palm Beach v. City of West Palm Beach, 55 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1951).
However, statutory district officers are subject to the executive power of suspension. In re
Opinion of the Justices, 121 Fla. 157, 163 So. 410 (1935).
175. But see State ex rel. Woodworth v. Amos, 98 Fla. 212, 123 So. 747 (1929); In re
Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 78 Fla. 9, 82 So. 608 (1919).
176. FLA. CoNsr. art. VIII, §1 (d).
177. Under the Dade County home rule amendment officers may be appointed to serve
at the pleasure of the county manager. See McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1966);
Dade County v. Kelly, 153 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1968).
178. FLA. CONST. art. IV, §7. If enacted by the 1971 legislature, proposed section
112.50, Florida Statutes, will confirm that the Governor's power of suspension is not affected
by, but exists concurrently with, statutory and charter provisiQs fQr suspension or removal
of state, county, or municipal officers.
179. FLA. CONST. art. IV, §6 (a).
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to place executive departments under the direct supervision of "an officer or
board appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the governor .. . .
That is, subsection (a) appears to authorize the legislature to qualify the
Governor's preceding authority to appoint such officers or boards by making
such appointments subject to either senate confirmation or the approval of
three cabinet members. However, subsection (a) does not appear to be limited
to heads of executive departments since it refers broadly to "any designated
statutory office."
Subsection (a) also appears to permit the legislature to condition the
removal of any designated statutory officer on senate confirmation or the approval of three cabinet members. It is at this point that the subsection becomes difficult to reconcile with the executive suspension section. The language of the subsection is ambiguous and appears to have been selected
without dear comprehension of the interrelationship between the removal
provisions of the subsection and the suspension and removal procedure set
forth in section 6.
The problem of reconciling the two provisions cannot be resolved properly
without due consideration of the Governor's supreme executive power, his
responsibility to see that the laws are faithfully executed, his authority to
require written information from or to initiate judicial proceedings against
"any executive or administrative state ... officer. .. ." and the important
public interests served by the executive power of suspension. It seems doubtful that the language of subsection (a) is intended to sanction the establishment of statutory offices in the executive branch that are beyond the reach
of the Governor's power of suspension. 18 '

180. Id. §6.
181. Id. §6(a). Nor should subsection (a) be construed to permit the senate's removal
of an officer under article IV, section 7(b), to be conditioned on the approval of three
cabinet members. The suspension section clearly contemplates that the senate's decision to
remove or reinstate a suspended official shall be final. In In re Advisory Opinion to the
Governor, 78 Fla. 9, 82 So. 608 (1919), it was held that the executive suspension section of
the 1885 constitution authorized the Governor to suspend only such officers as had been
elected by the people or appointed by the Governor. The choice of language in this conclusory opinion clearly has reference to article II, section 27, of the 1885 constitution,
which was omitted from the 1968 constitutional revision. The case should not be accepted
as sound authority for such a restriction of the suspension section under the 1968 constitution.
See also the questionable dictum in Blackburn v. Brorein, 70 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1954), to
the effect that although deputy sheriffs are officers they are not subject to suspension by
the Governor. As a practical matter, the Governor's power to suspend sheriffs probably
reduces the question of his power to suspend deputy sheriffs to a problem of largely
theoretical significance in individual cases. As legal precedent, however, the idea that an
express constitutional grant of jurisdiction to the chief executive can be superseded by a
conflicting statutory arrangement is a notion that strikes at the foundations of constitutional government. As pointed out in In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 52 So. 2d
646 (Fla. 1951), the executive power of suspension is the general rule and exceptions to it
are limited to those expressly named in the constitution. No such express exception
as to deputy sheriffs appears in either the 1885 or 1968 constitutions.
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Statutory Grounds for Suspension and Removal. In cases arising under
the 1885 constitution, the Supreme Court of Florida repeatedly declared that
the constitutional grounds of suspension and removal are exclusive and that
the Governor lacks executive jurisdiction to suspend officers on grounds other
than those specified in the constitution.182 All of these cases involved suspensions on constitutional grounds of officers having fixed terms of office. None of
these cases suggests that the Governor is limited to the constitutional grounds
in terminating an officer serving at the Governor's pleasure. As discussed
above, the Governor may summarily terminate such officers without cause
and the constitutional grounds are neither exclusive, nor, indeed, applicable,
in such cases. Nor do any of the foregoing cases involve statutory grounds
of suspension. They therefore do not reach the question of whether the constitutional grounds are exclusive in the sense that they cannot be defined,
supplemented, or altered by statute.
In numerous statutes, the legislature has provided for the suspension or
removal of officers on grounds that, to a greater or lesser extent, vary from
the constitutionally specified grounds. 183 Many of these statutes merely declare that specified acts or omissions shall be deemed to constitute malfeasance
or other constitutional grounds of suspension and removal.18 4 It would appear
to be within the province of the legislature to define particular instances of
such grounds as malfeasance, misfeasance, and neglect of duty, so long as
the statutory definitions do not purport to diminish the scope of the constitutional grounds and thereby impair the Governor's constitutional jurisdiction. Although some of these statutes speak in mandatory terms,18 5 they
should be properly construed as permissive in the sense of authorizing but
not requiring the Governor to exercise his suspension power.1 6 Otherwise,
such statutes would be objectionable as legislative attempts to interfere with
the Governor's constitutional discretion to decide whether a suspension order
should be issued in any particular instance.
The constitutional grounds of suspension also should not be deemed to
be exclusive in the sense of precluding legislative specification of supplemental grounds.1 87 Such an interpretation would unreasonably interfere with the
182. See State ex reL Hardie v. Coleman, 115 Fla. 119, 155 So. 129 (1934);
State ex rel. Hatton v. Joughin, 103 Fla. 877, 188 So. 392 (1931); State ex rel. Bridges v.
Henry, 60 Fla. 246,53 So. 742 (1910); Annot., 92 A.L.R. 988 (1934).
183. See the compilation of such statutes set forth in an appendix to this article.
184.

E.g., FLA. STAT. §§111.04, 137.06 (1969).

185. E.g., FLA. STAT. §§40.32, 839.04 (1969).
186. Such statutes likewise should not be construed as controlling the discretion and
judgment of the senate in reviewing executive suspension orders.
187. Many questions of statutory construction are raised by these statutes. In many
instances, the statutory grounds spedfied should be deemed to be declaratory of the constitutional grounds and insignificant and arbitrary variations of terminology should not
cause undue concern. For example, the statutory ground of "nonfeasance" should be
recognized as an instance of poor legislative draftsmanship and should not be deemed
to add anything of substance to the constitutional grounds. On the other hand, certain
statutory grounds clearly appear to exceed and supplement the constitutional grounds. E.g.,
FLA. STAT. §104.27 (1969), which provides for suspension and removal of officers on account
of violations of laws regulating campaign contributions and expenditures.
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legislature's powers and responsibilities in creating and regulating the incidents of public offices. Every sound consideration of public policy leads to
the conclusion that the legislature should have a broad discretion in defining particular acts, violations, and omissions as grounds for suspension as
the public need may require and as may be appropriate to the effective
functioning of particular offices. Moreover, if the legislature may establish
offices whose incumbents serve at the pleasure of the Governor, it is illogical
to say that the legislature is powerless to specify supplemental grounds for
suspension and removal of officers having fixed terms. In short, the constitutional grounds of suspension should be deemed to be exclusive only in the
absence of supplemental statutory grounds.
Although it seems clear that the constitutional grounds of suspension
may be supplemented by statute, it is doubtful that the constitutional grounds
can be limited or reduced by legislative action. Any statutory limitation or
restriction of the constitutional grounds would constitute a futile legislative
attempt to divest the Governor of an executive jurisdiction that is explicitly
conferred upon him by the constitution.
Therefore, statutory grounds cannot be deemed to qualify or limit the
operation of the constitutional grounds. For example, a statutory authorization to suspend an officer for "gross inefficiency or misconduct"1l 88 does not
convert the constitutional ground to "gross" neglect of duty. Similarly, statutory authorization to suspend an officer for conviction of a crime'89 does not
impair the Governor's authority to suspend the officer for commission of a
felony.
Legislative Regulation of Procedure. The 1968 constitution explicitly
authorizes the legislature to prescribe "by law" the senate proceedings whereby suspended officers are removed or reinstated. 190 The legislature presumably
may regulate other procedural aspects of the suspension and removal process
by statutory enactments that do not conflict with the constitution. However,
the basic procedure prescribed by the constitution cannot be superseded by
conflicting statutory provisions. The legislature undoubtedly lacks the authority to redistribute the particular powers that are explicitly vested in the
Governor and the senate by the suspension section of the constitution. For example, the 1968 constitution gives the Governor only the power to suspend,
but vests the power to remove in the senate. The senate's constitutional role
and duty in the suspension-removal process cannot be abrogated or renounced by statute. Accordingly, statutes that purport to authorize the
Governor to "remove"' 9 1 an officer from office should probably be construed
as declaratory of the executive power to "suspend" officers. Similarly, it should
be deemed to be beyond the authority of the legislature to provide for the
automatic suspension or removal of an officer to whom the suspension section
188. FLA.
189. E.g.,
190.

STAT.

§460.03 (1969).

FLA. STAT.

§471.08 (4) (1969).

FLA. CONST. art. IV, §7 (b).

191. E.g., FLA. STAT. §391.02 (1969).
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applies, 92 to limit the period of an officer's suspension,' 93 or to make suspension and removal of an officer mandatory rather than discretionary.' 9 '
CONCLUSION

In a democratic society, any interference with the tenure of an elected
public officer is a grave matter. But a mature democratic society does not accept the sophistry that a corrupt elected official should not be removed from
office because his election demonstrates that he is what the people want. The
people of Florida have expressly declared in their constitution that it is
not their will or desire to condone malfeasance, misfeasance, neglect of duty,
drunkenness, and other specified evils in their public offices. Moreover, the
people have conferred upon their Governor the clear authority and duty to
eliminate such evils when they occur. The diligent performance of that duty
is one of the most important responsibilities of the chief executive. Likewise,
one of the most important constitutional responsibilities of the Florida Senate
is to fairly and effectively review the Governor's exercise of his power of
suspension to ensure that it is not misused or abused. In the words of
Justice Terrell: 95
No more solemn duty is imposed on the Governor and the Senate, and
in the performance of that duty they should illuminate their course
by the Constitutional mandate and in its light protect society, and be
just to the officer suspended.

192.

E.g., FLA. STAT. §561.05 (1969). See FLA. STAT. §§114.02-.03 (1969), which provide

for the occurrence of vacancies in cabinet offices by operation of law. As discussed above,
these enactments are of doubtful constitutionality.
193. E.g., FLA. STAT. §§40.35, .32, 215.10 (1969). These statutes simply have not been
adjusted to the suspension procedure as set forth in the 1968 constitution.
194. E.g., FLA. STAT. § §40.32, 839.04 (1969).
195. State ex rel. Hardie v. Coleman, 115 Fla. 119, 130, 155 So. 129, 134 (1934).
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